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ARTICLES 
WHY LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUPER 
PACS SHOULD SURVIVE CITIZENS UNITED 
Albert W. Alschuler,* Laurence H. Tribe,** 
Norman L. Eisen*** & Richard W. Painter**** 
 
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. FEC, the D.C. 
Circuit held all limits on contributions to super PACs unconstitutional. Its 
decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC created a regime in which contributions 
to candidates are limited but in which contributions to less responsible 
groups urging votes for these candidates are unbounded.  
No legislator voted for this system of campaign financing, and the 
judgment that the Constitution requires it is astonishing.  Forty-two years 
ago, Buckley v. Valeo held that Congress could limit contributions to 
candidates because these contributions are corrupting or create an 
appearance of corruption.  According to the D.C. Circuit, however, Congress 
may not prohibit multi-million-dollar contributions to satellite campaigns 
because these contributions do not create even an appearance of corruption.  
The D.C. Circuit said that a single sentence of the Citizens United opinion 
compelled its result.  It wrote, “In light of the Court’s holding as a matter of 
law that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance 
of corruption, contributions to groups that make only independent 
expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.”  
This Article contends that, contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning, 
contributions to super PACs can corrupt even when expenditures by these 
groups do not.  Moreover, the statement that the D.C. Circuit took as its 
premise was dictum, and the Supreme Court did not mean this statement to 
be taken in the way the D.C. Circuit took it.  
The Supreme Court’s long-standing distinction between contribution 
limits and expenditure limits does not rest on the untenable proposition that 
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candidates cannot be corrupted by funds paid to and spent on their behalf by 
others.  Rather, Buckley noted five differences between contributions and 
expenditures.  A review of these differences makes clear that contributions to 
super PACs cannot be distinguished from the contributions to candidates 
whose limitation the Court upheld.   
The ultimate question posed by Buckley is whether super PAC 
contributions create a sufficient appearance of corruption to justify their 
limitation.  This Article reviews the statements of candidates of both parties 
in the 2016 presidential election, the views of Washington insiders, and 
public opinion polls.  It shows that SpeechNow has sharpened class divisions 
and helped to tear America apart.  
The Justice Department did not seek Supreme Court review of the 
SpeechNow decision.  In a statement that belongs on a historic list of wrong 
predictions, Attorney General Holder explained that the decision would 
“affect only a small subset of federally regulated contributions.”  Although 
eight years have passed since SpeechNow, the Supreme Court has not 
decided whether the Constitution guarantees the right to give unlimited funds 
to super PACs.  A final section of this Article describes the efforts of members 
of Congress and candidates for Congress to bring that question before the 
Court.  The Federal Election Commission is opposing their efforts, offering 
arguments that, if accepted, would be likely to keep the Court from ever 
deciding the issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Indefensible Policy and Incomprehensible Law 
Created by SpeechNow.org v. FEC 
In 2010, two months after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Citizens United 
v. FEC,1 the D.C. Circuit held all limits on contributions to super PACs 
unconstitutional.  Its decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC2 created a regime in 
which contributions to candidates are limited but in which contributions to 
“independent expenditure committees” urging votes for these candidates are 
unbounded. 
In the 2016 presidential campaign, for example, federal law barred hedge 
fund manager Donald Sussman from contributing as much as $5500 to 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign.3  Similarly, it barred hedge fund manager Robert 
Mercer from contributing $5500 to Donald Trump’s campaign.  Forty years 
earlier, in Buckley v. Valeo,4 the Supreme Court had upheld limits on 
contributions to candidates.5 
But federal law did not prohibit Donald Sussman from contributing $21 
million to Priorities USA Action, a super PAC whose principal mission was 
to place advertisements on behalf of Clinton.6  And it did not bar Robert 
Mercer from contributing $15.5 million to Make America Number 1, a super 
PAC that supported Ted Cruz in the Republican primaries and Trump in the 
general election.7  Until 2010, a federal statute limited contributions to groups 
 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 3. The law capped contributions to campaigns for federal office at $2700 per election or 
$5400 for both the primary and general elections. Contribution Limits for 2015–2016, FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/updates/contribution-limits-for-2015-2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/9XJ6-9JBG] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  
 4. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 5. Id. at 58. 
 6. See Outside Spending:  Sussman, S. Donald:  Donor Detail, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_detail.php?cycle=2016&id=U00000046
04&type=I&super=N&name=Sussman+S.+Donald [https://perma.cc/6WXN-4G9J] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018); see also Priorities Action USA, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C00495861&cycle=2016 
[https://perma.cc/EEF5-Q3JF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 7. See Outside Spending:  Mercer, Robert L.:  Donor Detail, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_detail.php?cycle=2016&id=U00000036
82&type=I&super=S&name=Mercer+Robert+L [https://perma.cc/F3XF-GC3L] (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2018); see also Make America Number 1, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/recips.php?cmte=C00575373&cycle=2016 
[https://perma.cc/XD3G-TZXC] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
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like Priorities USA Action and Make America Number 1 to $5000 per year,8 
but SpeechNow held this statute unconstitutional. 
“Super PACs” or “independent expenditure committees” are groups that 
do not make contributions to candidates but instead place their own 
advertisements supporting candidates or disparaging their opponents.  
Although these groups may not coordinate their expenditures with those of 
an official campaign,9 their managers often understand that their job is to 
attack an opponent while the candidate they support takes a higher road.10  
Super PACs have been called “the attack dogs and provocateurs of modern 
politics.”11  The advertisements they produce contribute to the nation’s 
cynicism about politics, a cynicism that runs especially deep among young 
people.12  The candidates they support need not take responsibility for what 
they say, and the groups usually disappear once an election is over. 
Limits on contributions to candidates no longer restrict how much people 
can give to electoral efforts.  They simply require contributors to channel 
their funds to less responsible and more destructive speakers.13  No sane 
 
 8. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (2012).  
 9. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20–.23 (2018).  “Independent expenditure committees” need not 
be entirely independent.  Candidates may, within limits, urge people to contribute to these 
groups and may speak at their gatherings. See FEC, Advisory Opinion 2011-12 (Majority PAC 
and House Majority PAC) (June 30, 2011), http://saos.fec.gov/saos/searchao? 
AONUMBER=2011-12 [https://perma.cc/8PCD-M8K3] (enter “2011-12” in “Go to AO 
number” field and press “Search”).  They may thank contributors for making donations to 
super PACs, share fundraising consultants with super PACs, and provide lists of prospective 
donors to super PACs. Note, Working Together for an Independent Expenditure, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1478, 1480, 1485–86 (2015).  A recent solicitation for funds by a super PAC advised 
a prospective donor, “We are the blessed Super PAC by Sen. Toomey . . . .  I am his former 
senior aide and finance director, and I am working with his former chief-of-staff.” Robert 
Faturechi & Lauren Kirchner, Super PAC to Billionaire:  We Need More Money to Save a 
Republican Senate, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 14, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/super-pac-to-billionaire-we-need-more-money-to-save-a-republican-senate 
[https://perma.cc/Q7SJ-U4M5]. 
 10. See David A. Graham, The Incredible Negative Spending of Super PACs—in 1 Chart, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/the-
incredible-negative-spending-of-super-pacs-in-1-chart/263643/ [https://perma.cc/3L77-
REW6] (reporting that, in the 2012 presidential campaign, Republican super PACs spent three 
times more attacking the Democratic candidate than they did supporting the Republican 
candidate and that Democratic super PACs spent nine times more attacking the Republican 
candidate than they did supporting the Democratic candidate).   
 11. Jeremy W. Peters, Conservative ‘Super PACs’ Synchronize Their Messages, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/conservative-super-
pacs-sharpen-their-synchronized-message.html [https://perma.cc/4YBW-RVZQ].  
 12. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND DISTRUST:  HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR 
GOVERNMENT 4 (2015), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2015/11/11-
23-2015-Governance-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2YP-99AZ]; Sheryl Gay Stoleberg, For 
‘Millennials,’ a Tide of Cynicism and a Partisan Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/us/politics/for-millennial-voters-a-tide-of-cynicism-
toward-politics.html [https://perma.cc/SQ3M-5QAQ]. 
 13. See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 
123 YALE L.J. 412, 455 (2013) (“I am skeptical of any governmental effort to police campaign 
speech to make it less negative, vitriolic, or immoderate, but there is little to be said for laws 
that exacerbate these vices.”).  Donors typically give the maximum allowable amount to the 
candidates they favor and then make additional donations to super PACs supporting the same 
candidates.  In doing so, they apparently seek to obtain with super PAC contributions what the 
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legislator would vote in favor of this system of campaign financing, and none 
ever has.  The United States has this regime because the D.C. Circuit held 
that the First Amendment requires it. 
The claim that the Constitution requires this topsy-turvy state of affairs, 
however, is astonishing.  According to the Supreme Court, Congress may 
prohibit a $5500 contribution to an official campaign because this 
contribution is corrupting or creates the appearance of corruption.14  
According to the D.C. Circuit, however, Congress may not prohibit a $20 
million contribution to a super PAC because this contribution does not create 
even an appearance of corruption.15  The D.C. Circuit reached this conclusion 
not on the basis of empirical investigation but as a matter of law.16 
B.  The SpeechNow Syllogism 
The D.C. Circuit did not argue that the system of campaign financing it 
created was desirable or defensible, and it did not argue that the law it created 
was sound or coherent.  The court made no effort to distinguish contributions 
to super PACs from contributions to candidates.  It offered no defense of the 
merits of its ruling.  The court simply announced that a single sentence of the 
Citizens United opinion compelled its result. 
The Supreme Court wrote in Citizens United, “We now conclude that 
independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance 
of corruption,”17 and the D.C. Circuit declared, 
In light of the Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent 
expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption, contributions to groups that make only independent 
expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.18 
This Article will refer to this declaration as the SpeechNow syllogism:  If the 
money going out of a super PAC does not corrupt, the money coming into a 
super PAC cannot corrupt either. 
Citizens United and SpeechNow presented very different issues.  In 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck down limits on a political group’s 
expenditures while the issue in SpeechNow was the validity of limiting 
contributions to a political group.  The Court has treated these two sorts of 
restrictions differently.  In Buckley v. Valeo, although the Court upheld limits 
 
law prevents them from getting with direct donations to candidates. See STEPHEN R. 
WEISSMAN, THE SPEECHNOW CASE AND THE REAL WORLD OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE tbls.1–2 
(2016), https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/FSFP-Weissman-
Report-final-10-24-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LQL-XF65]. 
 14. Buckley said, “It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose to limit the 
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions 
in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1000 contribution limitation.” 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam). 
 15. SpeechNow said, “[C]ontributions to groups that make only independent 
expenditures . . . cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.” SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
 18. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694. 
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on contributions to candidates,19 it struck down limits on expenditures by 
candidates.20  It also struck down limits on expenditures by individuals and 
groups that independently advocate a candidate’s election.21 
Decisions since Buckley have confirmed that expenditure limits and 
contribution limits are judged by different standards.  Limits on expenditures 
are subject to strict scrutiny; these limits must “further a compelling interest” 
and must be “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”22  Contribution 
limits are not subject to strict scrutiny.  These limits must merely be “closely 
drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest.”23  In the years since 
Buckley, the Supreme Court has struck down every expenditure limit to come 
before it, but it has upheld most contribution limits.24  A later section of this 
Article will discuss the reasons for the Court’s distinction.25 
Citizens United did not disrupt the pattern of the earlier cases.  The 
Supreme Court observed that “contribution limits, . . . unlike limits on 
independent expenditures, have been an accepted means to prevent quid pro 
quo corruption.”26  In its opening paragraph, its closing paragraph, and many 
places in between, the Court emphasized that the case before it concerned 
only expenditure limits. 
In SpeechNow, the court acknowledged for purposes of decision that the 
case before it concerned only contribution limits and that these limits were 
not subject to strict scrutiny.  The court nevertheless saw Citizens United as 
implicitly resolving the issue the Court had set aside—the validity of 
 
 19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23–35. 
 20. Id. at 54–58. 
 21. Id. at 39–51.   
 22. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 
U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
 23. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 158–59 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 378–88 (2000).  
 24. The Court struck down expenditure limits in Buckley; First National Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 
470 U.S. 480 (1985); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Colorado 
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I), 518 U.S. 604 (1996); and 
Citizens United.   
The Court upheld contribution limits in Buckley; California Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 453 
U.S. 182 (1981); Shrink Missouri Government PAC; Beaumont; and McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.  It struck down 
contribution limits in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) 
(declaring limits on contributions to groups supporting or opposing referendums 
unconstitutional because these contributions pose no risk of corrupting public officials); 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s extremely low limits); and 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating limits on the total amount an 
individual may contribute to all candidates and political committees during a single election 
cycle).  In FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), 533 
U.S. 431 (2001), the Court said, “[W]e have routinely struck down limitations on independent 
expenditures by candidates, other individuals, and groups, while repeatedly upholding 
contribution limits,” id. at 441–42. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359.  
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contribution limits.27  The SpeechNow syllogism rendered the distinction 
between contributions and expenditures irrelevant: 
[B]ecause Citizens United holds that independent expenditures do not 
corrupt or give the appearance of corruption as a matter of law, then the 
government can have no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions 
to independent expenditure-only organizations.  No matter which standard 
of review governs contribution limits, the limits on contributions to 
SpeechNow cannot stand.28 
In Citizens United, according to the D.C. Circuit, “the [Supreme] Court 
held that the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting 
independent expenditures.”29  It italicized the word no.  Whatever the 
standard of review might be, the court said, “something . . . outweighs 
nothing every time.”30  Acknowledging even a smidgen, soupçon, or scintilla 
of regulatory interest would have undercut the court’s analysis entirely.  
Under the Supreme Court’s two-tier standard of review, an interest that 
cannot justify a restriction of expenditures can justify a restriction of 
contributions, but the government may not restrict even low-value speech 
when its interest in doing so is nonexistent. 
SpeechNow was a unanimous en banc decision.  The court’s syllogism 
persuaded all nine of its judges, including the three appointed by Democrats.  
In the years since SpeechNow, its syllogism has convinced five additional 
federal courts of appeals to strike down limits on contributions to super 
PACs.31  The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has acquiesced in the 
SpeechNow decision,32 and academic criticism of the ruling has been 
 
 27. See id. at 359 (“Citizens United . . . has not suggested that the Court should reconsider 
whether contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.”).  
 28. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 29. Id. at 693. 
 30. Id. at 695 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 
879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 31. Some of these decisions approved only preliminary injunctions.  They thus resolved 
the question tentatively but not definitively. See N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 
F.3d 483, 487, 489 (2d Cir. 2013) (approving a preliminary injunction); see also Vt. Right to 
Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 140 (2d Cir. 2014) (leaving open whether the Second 
Circuit should follow SpeechNow despite that circuit’s approval of a preliminary injunction 
against the enforcement of Super Pac contributions limits in New York Progress & Protection 
PAC); Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1095–96, 1103 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(approving a preliminary injunction); Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 
535, 537–38 (5th Cir. 2013) (same); Wis. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. 
Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 154–55 (7th Cir. 2011); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. 
City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 696–99 (9th Cir. 2010).  In all of the cases striking down 
limitations on contributions to super PACS, government lawyers argued that contribution 
limits differed from expenditure limits, and, in all of them, courts responded by endorsing the 
SpeechNow syllogism.  The Seventh Circuit described this syllogism as inexorable. See 
Barland, 664 F.3d at 154.  One other court of appeals had made a ruling resembling 
SpeechNow prior to the D.C. Circuit’s decision. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 
274, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that North Carolina did not make a sufficient evidentiary 
showing to justify its limit on contributions to super PACs); see also EMILY’s List v. FEC, 
581 F.3d 1, 11, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (foreshadowing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow).  
 32. See FEC, Advisory Opinion 2010-11 (Commonsense Ten) (July 22, 2010), 
http://saos.fec.gov/saos/searchao?AONUMBER=2010-11 [https://perma.cc/QT2T-X9WU] 
(enter “2010-11” in “Go to AO number” field and press “Search”). 
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sparse.33  One commentator declared that Citizens United “utterly removed 
room for argument about Super PACs”34 and “made SpeechNow an easy case 
with only one possible outcome.”35 
The Justice Department did not seek Supreme Court review of the 
SpeechNow decision.  Attorney General Eric Holder explained in a letter to 
Senator Harry Reid, “[T]he court of appeals’ decision will affect only a small 
subset of federally regulated contributions . . . .”36 
Holder’s statement belongs on a historic list of wrong predictions near that 
of the manager of the Grand Ole Opry who told Elvis Presley, “You ain’t 
goin’ nowhere, son—you ought to go back to drivin’ a truck.”37  In 2016, 
2392 super PACs campaigning in federal elections raised $1.79 billion.38  
Sixty-one percent of this amount came from one hundred donors (individuals 
and groups),39 and 43 percent came from the top one hundred individual 
donors.40  The amounts given by these top donors ranged from $89.5 million 
(Thomas Steyer) to $1.36 million (Steven Spielberg).41  The average amount 
 
 33. One of the authors of this Article did criticize SpeechNow. See generally Albert W. 
Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United, and 
SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389 (2016).  Alschuler’s criticism appeared, however, amidst a 
120-page article addressing other topics.  With his permission and that of the Florida Law 
Review, this coauthored Article sometimes draws from and builds upon Alschuler’s earlier 
article without using quotation marks or noting the pages of the earlier article in which his 
analysis appeared. See also Stephen R. Weissman, Courting Corruption, AM. INTEREST (Aug. 
25, 2017), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/08/25/courting-corruption/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z369-F92N] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (criticizing SpeechNow).  
 34. Michael S. Kang, Essay, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 
1912 (2013). 
 35. Id. at 1911.   
 36. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to Harry Reid, U.S. Senate 
Majority Leader (June 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/ 
legacy/2014/07/23/06-16-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAA4-HMHF].  Although the Justice 
Department did not seek certiorari in SpeechNow, the plaintiffs did.  They maintained that 
independent expenditure committees should not be required to register as political committees.  
The Justice Department filed a brief in opposition to the plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari. See 
generally Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Keating v. FEC, 562 U.S. 1003 (2010) (No. 
10-144).  In Keating, the court denied a writ of certiorari to review SpeechNow. Keating, 562 
U.S. 1003. 
 37. See Victor Navasky, Tomorrow Never Knows, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 29, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/29/magazine/tomorrow-never-knows.html 
[https://perma.cc/2RDT-VD9D]; see also id. (reporting Albert Einstein’s 1932 statement that 
“there is not the slightest chance that [nuclear] energy will ever be obtainable”). 
 38. See 2016 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016&chrt=V&disp=O&typ
e=S [https://perma.cc/Q3YV-M8YM] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 39. See 2016 Super PACs:  How Many Donors Give?, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=B 
[https://perma.cc/9VQC-42R4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (discussing both individuals and 
organizations). 
 40. See 2016 Super PACs:  How Many Donors Give?, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=I 
[https://perma.cc/FK23-SP7Y] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (discussing only individuals).  
 41. See 2016 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016&disp=D&type=V&su
peronly=S [https://perma.cc/8ZMV-MFR2] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).   
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contributed by the top one hundred donors was $7.7 million.42  What 
Attorney General Holder called “a small subset of federally regulated 
contributions” had become the creature that ate federal election law.43  
Although eight years have passed since SpeechNow, the Supreme Court has 
not decided whether Congress’s limits on contributions to super PACs are 
valid. 
This Article offers three criticisms of the SpeechNow syllogism: 
(1) The syllogism is fallacious.  Contributions to super PACs can corrupt 
even when expenditures by these groups do not. 
(2) The major premise of the syllogism—Citizens United’s statement that 
independent expenditures do not corrupt—was dictum, a nonbinding 
aside. 
(3) Other statements in the Citizens United opinion and a Supreme Court 
decision shortly before Citizens United make clear that the Supreme 
Court did not mean that independent expenditures do not corrupt at 
all. 
Following this Article’s criticism of the SpeechNow syllogism, it considers 
an argument for the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that the D.C. Circuit did not make.  
In separate opinions twenty-two years apart, Justice Blackmun and Justice 
Kennedy suggested that the distinction between contributions and 
expenditures is a distinction between contributions to candidates (broadly 
defined as donations whose spending candidates can influence) and all other 
forms of campaign financing.44  In their view, candidates cannot be corrupted 
by funds whose expenditure they do not control.  These Justices regarded 
contributions to independent-expenditure groups not as contributions but as 
expenditures. 
Plurality opinions and one majority opinion have rejected this view.45  
Moreover, as this Article shows, this argument for the SpeechNow result 
misses the reasons the Supreme Court distinguished contributions from 
expenditures.  The Court did not endorse the untenable view that candidates 
and officeholders cannot be corrupted by contributions that others spend on 
their behalf. 
Buckley instead pointed to a number of differences between contributions 
and expenditures.  One difference was that funds whose expenditure a 
candidate controls are likely to be more valuable to him than funds spent by 
others on his behalf.46  Another, however, was that “the transformation of 
contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 
contributor.”47  A review of all the concerns that prompted the Supreme 
 
 42. Id.  
 43. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 36.  
 44. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 290–301 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Cal. 
Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).  
 45. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152 (majority opinion); Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 193–
99 (plurality opinion); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado I), 518 
U.S. 604, 617 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
 46. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam). 
 47. Id. at 21.   
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Court to distinguish between contributions and expenditures shows that 
contributions to super PACs differ from the expenditures whose restriction 
the Court struck down.  Contributions to super PACs, however, cannot 
reasonably be distinguished from the contributions to candidates whose 
restriction the Court upheld.  Super PAC contributions are indeed 
contributions. 
After addressing the SpeechNow syllogism and exploring the reasons for 
the Supreme Court’s distinction between contributions and expenditures, this 
Article focuses on the ultimate question posed by Buckley.  Do unlimited 
super PAC contributions create a sufficient appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption to justify congressional restriction?  The appearance of corruption 
created by these contributions is in fact intense, pervasive, and reasonable.  
SpeechNow has sharpened class divisions and helped to tear America apart. 
After explaining why limits on contributions to super PACs should survive 
Citizens United, this Article examines the difficulty of bringing the issue 
before the Supreme Court.  It describes the efforts of this Article’s authors, 
other lawyers, members of Congress, candidates for Congress, and the 
public-interest organization Free Speech for People to secure an authoritative 
Supreme Court resolution of the question. 
I.  THE DEFICIENCIES OF SPEECHNOW 
A.  SpeechNow’s Supposed Syllogism Is Fallacious 
Although SpeechNow concluded that “contributions to groups that make 
only independent expenditures . . . cannot corrupt,”48 a federal grand jury 
took a different view when, in 2015, it indicted U.S. Senator Robert 
Menendez and Dr. Solomon Melgen for bribery. 
The indictment alleged that Dr. Melgen made two $300,000 contributions 
to a super PAC supporting Senator Menendez’s reelection.  According to the 
indictment, he made these contributions “in return for Mendendez’s 
advocacy at the highest levels of [two federal agencies] on behalf of Melgen 
in his Medicare billing dispute.”49 
Menendez and Melgen moved to dismiss the charges based on the super 
PAC contributions.  They maintained that “no quid pro quo corruption can 
arise when a private citizen contributes to a bona fide Super PAC, because a 
bona fide Super PAC does not coordinate its expenditures with a 
candidate.”50  A federal court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that the 
federal bribery statute forbids corruptly seeking “anything of value 
personally or for any other person or entity, in return for being influenced in 
the performance of any official act.”51  The court quoted a Seventh Circuit 
decision:  “A participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an 
 
 48. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 49. Indictment at 61–63, United States v. Menendez, 132 F. Supp. 3d 635 (D.N.J. 2015) 
(No. 15-155), 2015 WL 1457957 (counts fifteen through eighteen). 
 50. Menendez, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 639. 
 51. Id. at 640 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012)). 
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altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants.”52  Just 
as a public official cannot escape a bribery conviction by saying, “Please pay 
the money to my sister,” he cannot avoid conviction by saying, “Please pay 
the money to my alter-ego super PAC.” 
After a jury failed to reach a verdict on the charges against Menendez and 
Melgen, the trial court again rejected the defendants’ contention that a 
contribution to a super PAC cannot be a bribe.53  The court noted, however, 
that neither a super PAC contribution nor a contribution to a candidate can 
be a bribe in the absence of an “explicit” quid pro quo.54  Because the 
government’s evidence at trial did not establish an explicit quid pro quo, the 
court dismissed the charges based on Melgen’s political contributions.55  Its 
dismissal led the government to announce that it would not retry the 
defendants on the other charges.56 
Menendez and Melgen avoided conviction, but a case in which a candidate 
expressly promises official action in exchange for a super PAC contribution 
reveals the senselessness of the bottom line of the SpeechNow opinion:  
“[C]ontributions to groups that make only independent expenditures . . . 
cannot corrupt . . . .”57  Designating an independent expenditure group as an 
official’s beneficiary cannot legalize bribe-taking, and it cannot make bribe-
taking a First Amendment right. 
A super PAC contribution given in return for official favors will be spent 
in the same way as other contributions.  It will buy advertisements and bring 
information to the public.  This contribution is no less “speech” than any 
other contribution.  If it were true that “contributions to groups that make 
only independent expenditures . . . cannot corrupt,” the government would 
have no interest in regulating this speech.  It could no more restrict super 
PAC contributions through the law of bribery than it could through campaign 
finance law. 
The question remains whether the D.C. Circuit fairly disclaimed 
responsibility for its unfounded conclusion by pointing to the Supreme Court.  
Did this conclusion follow ineluctably from Citizens United’s declaration 
that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption”?58 
Notice that the Menendez-Melgen indictment did not allege that the super 
PAC that received Melgen’s funds did anything wrong or that its 
expenditures corrupted Menendez.  Contrary to the analysis of the D.C. 
 
 52. Id. (quoting United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2005)).   
 53. United States v. Menendez, No. 15 Cr. 155, 2018 WL 526746, at *9–11 (D.N.J. Jan. 
24, 2018).  
 54. Id. at *11–12; see also infra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.   
 55. Menendez, 2018 WL 526746, at *11–12. 
 56. Nick Corasaniti, Justice Department Moves to Dismiss Corruption Case Against 
Menendez, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/nyregion/ 
justice-department-moves-to-dismiss-corruption-case-against-menendez.html 
[http://perma.cc/8CZM-QKVQ]. 
 57. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).   
 58. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
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Circuit, super PAC contributions can corrupt even when these groups’ 
expenditures do not.  The SpeechNow syllogism is fallacious. 
Of course a contribution to a super PAC might turn out to have little value 
to a candidate if the super PAC never spent it.  The corrupting effect of a 
contribution, however, does not depend on the purposes for which it is spent 
or whether it is spent at all.  A senator who agreed to vote in favor of widget 
subsidies in exchange for a widget maker’s donation to the Red Cross might 
see little value in the donation unless the Red Cross put this donation to use.  
Even if the Red Cross never spent the donation, however, the senator and the 
widget maker would be guilty of bribery.  Moreover, if the Red Cross did use 
the donation for the benevolent purposes the senator sought to advance, the 
D.C. Circuit probably would not say that, because the Red Cross’s 
expenditures did great good and did not corrupt anyone, the widget maker’s 
contribution could not corrupt either.59 
The Federal Election Commission has acquiesced in the SpeechNow 
decision and is currently resisting a legal challenge to SpeechNow by 
members of Congress and congressional candidates.60  Even the FEC, 
however, apparently recognizes that super PAC contributions can corrupt.  A 
federal statute forbids political contributions by government contractors,61 
and the FEC recently sanctioned a contractor for violating this statute 
although the only group to which it contributed was a super PAC supporting 
the presidential candidacy of Hillary Clinton.62 
This super PAC no doubt used the money it received from the government 
contractor in the same way as its other dollars.  If the legitimacy of a group’s 
expenditures established the legitimacy of the contributions it received, 
contributions by government contractors could not be proscribed.  Even 
donations by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un would be constitutionally 
protected.  There are good reasons for prohibiting political contributions by 
government contractors and the leaders of foreign governments, and 
Congress has prohibited them.63  But one cannot plausibly distinguish more 
corrupting from less corrupting contributions while insisting that, as a matter 
 
 59. The SpeechNow syllogism seems to rest on the proposition that the greater includes 
the lesser. If a super PAC’s final products (expenditures) do not corrupt, the components of 
these products (contributions) cannot corrupt either.  But super PAC contributions can corrupt 
before they become part of the final product.  They can corrupt even if they are never spent 
because a super PAC manager absconds with them to Rio. 
 60. This Article describes the FEC’s resistance infra Part IV.   
 61. 52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1) (2012).  
 62. MUR #7099:  Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/7099/ [https://perma.cc/5PZP-DP5S] 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  In this case file, see especially the First General Counsel’s Report 
of February 14, 2017, and the Conciliation Agreement of September 25, 2017. 
 63. See 52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1) (prohibiting political contributions by government 
contractors); id. § 30121 (prohibiting political contributions and expenditures by foreign 
nationals); Bluman v. FEC, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (mem.) (upholding Congress’s ban on 
contributions and expenditures by foreign nationals), aff’g 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011).  
Applying either ban to super PAC contributions would be incompatible with the reasoning of 
SpeechNow.   
2018] LIMITS ON SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS 2311 
of logic and law, contributions to independent-expenditure groups cannot 
corrupt at all. 
Like the FEC, a three-judge federal district court in the District of 
Columbia recently rejected the SpeechNow syllogism.64  In an opinion by 
Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan, the court declared that even when a political 
party’s soft-money expenditures are independent of any candidate and do not 
corrupt, contributions to the party for the purpose of making these 
expenditures do corrupt:  “[T]he inducement occasioning the prospect of 
indebtedness on the part of a federal officeholder is not the spending of 
money by the political party.  The inducement instead comes from the 
contribution of soft money to the party in the first place.”65  The court sought 
to distinguish SpeechNow by suggesting that the ties between candidates and 
parties are closer than those between candidates and super PACs.66  But 
SpeechNow did not offer this empirical judgment; it rested on a supposedly 
compelling logical deduction—one that the three-judge court plainly did not 
accept.  The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the three-judge court’s 
decision.67 
Corruption by contribution rather than expenditure is what happens in 
practice.  It is the six-, seven-, and eight-figure donations to super PACs that 
create the appearance (and likely the reality) of corruption, not the groups’ 
expenditures.  When an op-ed writer complains that the government has 
become “like a corporation, with the richest 0.001 percent buying shares and 
demanding board seats,”68 he speaks of donors to super PACs, not of the 
operatives who determine how their funds are spent.  People who decry the 
influence of David and Charles Koch,69 Sheldon Adelson,70 George Soros,71 
and George Clooney72 probably do not know the names of the managers who 
receive and spend these donors’ funds.  It is the check writers, not the money 
spenders, who may have given America its sugar subsidies, its special tax 
 
 64. Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 86, 98 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 137 S. 
Ct. 2178 (2017) (mem.). 
 65. Id. at 97. 
 66. Id. at 98. 
 67. Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017) (mem.).  Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch—but notably, not Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito—dissented 
from the Court’s affirmance and would have set the case for argument. Id. 
 68. David M. Magerman, When a Hedge Fund Billionaire ‘Buys’ Democracy, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Mar. 1, 2017, 10:55 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inq-phillydeals/ 
Billionaires_and_Democracy_Magerman_Mercer_Renaissance_Trump_Bannon_Conway.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/J85U-6WAN].   
 69. See generally JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY:  THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE 
BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016) (describing the political activity 
of the Koch brothers and its impact).   
 70. See, e.g., Sheldon Adelson’s Billions Shape U.S. Politics as Many Question His 
Influence, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2012, 2:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2012/nov/01/sheldon-adelson-billions-politics-influence [https://perma.cc/ZE3H-JRSL].  
 71. See, e.g., Richard Larsen, This Is Why We Should Fear George Soros, Not the Koch 
Brothers, W. JOURNALISM (Apr. 10, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.westernjournalism.com/ 
koch-brothers-george-soros-fear/ [https://perma.cc/765N-3EJP].   
 72. See, e.g., George Clooney Wants You to BELIEVE He Doesn’t Buy Political Influence, 
BUZZKIX.COM (Oct. 3, 2016), http://buzzkix.com/george-clooney-wants-you-to-believe-he-
doesnt-buy-political-influence/ [https://perma.cc/QCU4-2C32].   
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treatment of carried interest, and its armaments approved by Congress despite 
opposition by the Pentagon.  A campaign finance system like the one 
authorized by Buckley—one in which contributions are limited but in which 
candidates, parties, and super PACS may spend whatever they receive—
would notably limit corruption.  As Buckley observed, “The interest in 
alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is served by the 
Act’s contribution limitations and disclosure provisions rather than . . . 
campaign expenditure ceilings.”73 
B.  The Statement upon Which the D.C. Circuit Relied Was Dictum 
SpeechNow characterized Citizens United’s statement that independent 
expenditures do not corrupt as something the Supreme Court had held as a 
matter of law.74  The Court’s statement, however, was dictum. 
Citizens United was argued twice. After the initial argument, the Court 
restored the case to the docket and ordered the parties to address an issue they 
had not previously considered.75  Two of the Court’s earlier decisions had 
held that political speech could be restricted simply because the speaker was 
a corporation.76  The Court asked whether these decisions should be 
overruled. 
The first part of the Citizens United opinion did overrule the earlier 
decisions.  It held that a group’s speech cannot be restricted simply because 
the group is incorporated.77  The Supreme Court declared that the First 
Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, 
allowing speech by some but not by others.”78  It found “no basis for the 
proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may 
impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”79  It noted that “[s]peech 
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a 
means to control content.”80  It concluded that “the Government cannot 
restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”81 
This holding fully resolved the case before the Court.  A statute restricted 
a group’s political expenditures only because the group was a corporation.  
This statute was unconstitutional.  However strong the government’s 
regulatory interest might have been, the government could not advance this 
interest by limiting only corporate speech.  The case seemed over. 
The Supreme Court, however, did not stop.  It noted that Buckley v. Valeo 
had regarded only one interest as “sufficiently important” to justify limiting 
 
 73. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976) (per curiam). 
 74. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 75. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (No. 08-205) (order restoring the case to 
the calendar for reargument). 
 76. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 658–60 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.  
 77. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346. 
 78. Id. at 340. 
 79. Id. at 341. 
 80. Id. at 340. 
 81. Id. at 346.  
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campaign contributions and expenditures—“the prevention of corruption and 
the appearance of corruption.”82  It added, “When Buckley identified a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo 
corruption.”83  The Court concluded, “The anticorruption interest is not 
sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”84  This statement fully 
resolved the case before the Court a second time. 
Either branch of the Citizens United opinion would have sufficed without 
the other.  Once the Court held that the government may not restrict 
independent expenditures on the basis of corporate identity, there was no 
reason for it to consider whether the government may restrict independent 
expenditures at all.  And if the Court had said initially that independent 
expenditures are insufficiently corrupting for Congress ever to restrict them, 
there would have been no reason for it to consider whether this speech-related 
activity may be restricted on the basis of corporate identity. 
Offering both conclusions at once contravened the familiar principle that 
a court should not decide constitutional issues in advance of necessity.85  This 
principle means among other things that a court should not make two 
constitutional rulings when one will do.  As Chief Justice Roberts observed 
before joining the Supreme Court, “[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it 
is necessary not to decide more.”86 
Even after resolving the case twice, the Supreme Court did not stop.  Three 
sentences after it declared, “The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to 
displace the speech here in question,” it offered the statement that drove the 
SpeechNow decision:  “[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures 
. . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”87  The 
Court’s initial statement declared the anticorruption interest insufficient to 
support a restriction of independent expenditures, but the D.C. Circuit read 
the second statement as declaring this interest nonexistent.  So interpreted, 
the statement went far beyond any issue before the Court. 
If the Court had offered only its initial formulation, the D.C. Circuit could 
not have written the opinion it wrote in SpeechNow.  The major premise of 
the court’s syllogism would not have existed.  The court could not have 
declared that “the [Supreme] Court held that the government has no anti-
corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.”88  It could not have 
relied on the proposition that “something . . . outweighs nothing every 
time.”89  The court instead would have been required to assess the strength 
 
 82. Id. at 345 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1976) (per curiam)).   
 83. Id. at 359.  
 84. Id. at 357. 
 85. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring).   
 86. PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring 
in part).   
 87. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.  
 88. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
 89. Id. at 695 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 
879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
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of the government’s regulatory interest, recognizing that an interest too weak 
to justify a restriction of expenditures can justify a restriction of 
contributions. 
In a decision that followed Citizens United, four dissenting Justices 
criticized Citizens United’s description of the kind of corruption needed to 
justify a restriction of independent expenditures.90  They observed that the 
Court’s language should be regarded “as dictum, as an overstatement, or as 
limited to the context in which it appears.”91  These Justices were correct.  
Indeed, the statement that became a major premise of the SpeechNow 
syllogism was not merely dictum; it was dictum twice over. 
C.  The Supreme Court Did Not Mean Its Dictum Literally 
One might take a conspiratorial view of Citizens United’s ambiguous 
declaration that independent expenditures do not corrupt.  Perhaps five 
Justices of the Supreme Court, realizing that Justices with their perspective 
might not constitute a majority of the Court forever, reached out to resolve 
issues not before them, including the issue that soon came before the D.C. 
Circuit in SpeechNow.  Perhaps these activist Justices truly meant to say that 
independent expenditures do not corrupt even a smidgen, and perhaps they 
swept so expansively in a calculated effort to control the future.  We doubt, 
however, that the Justices in the majority had any such grand or devious 
strategy.  It seems more likely that they did not mean their dictum to be taken 
in the way the D.C. Circuit took it. 
The Supreme Court slipped easily from its declaration that independent 
expenditures are insufficiently corrupting as to justify their restriction to its 
declaration that these expenditures do not corrupt at all.  Under Buckley’s 
two-tiered standard of review, these two statements have different 
consequences, but the Court gave no sign that it recognized any notable 
difference between them.92 
The Court again indicated that it failed to notice any important difference 
between its two formulations when it attributed the stronger of these 
formulations to Buckley.  It wrote, “This confirms Buckley’s reasoning that 
independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid 
pro quo corruption.”93  Buckley, however, had said no such thing.  It had 
endorsed only the weaker formulation:  “We find that the governmental 
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is 
 
 90. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1471 (2014) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Slight literary imprecision can have huge consequences. See, e.g., O’Connor v. 
Oakhurst Dairy, 851 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2017) (concluding that the absence of a comma 
before the final item in a statutory series required an award of overtime pay that would not 
have been allowed if the comma had been present); Daniel Victor, Lack of Oxford Comma 
Could Cost Maine Company Millions in Overtime Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/us/oxford-comma-lawsuit.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/S6FV-6CC5]. 
 93. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).   
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inadequate to justify § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on independent expenditures.”94  
And again:  “The independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not 
presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable 
to those identified with large campaign contributions.”95 
Before Citizens United, two of the Justices who joined the majority opinion 
expressly recognized that independent expenditures can corrupt.  In FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,96 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, 
declared, “[I]t may be that, in some circumstances, ‘large independent 
expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo 
arrangements as do large contributions.’”97  In fact, Justice Roberts noted, 
“We have suggested that this interest might . . . justify limits on 
electioneering expenditures. . . .”98 
Probably the clearest indication that the Court did not mean its dictum 
literally is that this statement, if taken literally, would be inconsistent with a 
ruling the Court made less than a year before it decided Citizens United.  In 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,99 the Court considered the effect of 
political contributions and expenditures made by the chief executive officer 
of the Massey Coal Company, Don Blankenship.  The Court’s opinion was 
by Justice Kennedy, the same Justice who wrote the opinion in Citizens 
United.100 
After a jury returned a $50 million verdict against Massey, Blankenship 
spent more than $3 million to prevent the reelection of a justice of the state 
supreme court that would hear Massey’s appeal.  The incumbent justice was 
defeated, and his replacement provided the decisive vote for reversing the 
$50 million verdict against Massey. 
The Supreme Court held that the newly elected justice’s refusal to recuse 
himself from the coal company’s appeal violated the Due Process Clause.  
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, “We conclude that there is a serious risk 
of actual bias . . . when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had 
a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case 
by raising funds . . . when the case was pending or imminent.”101  Citizens 
United distinguished Caperton by noting that Caperton’s “holding was 
limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s 
political speech could be banned.”102 
Judicial recusal and limiting independent expenditures are indeed different 
remedies, and Caperton’s ruling that the Constitution required one of these 
remedies was consistent with Citizens United’s ruling that the Constitution 
prohibited the other.  If Blankenship’s expenditures did “not give rise to 
 
 94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).  
 96. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 97. Id. at 478 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45).  
 98. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 99. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 100. Justice Kennedy was in fact the only Justice to join both five-to-four decisions.  
 101. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884. 
 102. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
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corruption or the appearance of corruption,” however, why was any remedy 
required?  Could these expenditures have produced “a serious risk of actual 
bias” without giving rise to even an appearance of corruption?  A near army 
of commentators have observed that Caperton’s holding is inconsistent with 
Citizens United’s statement that “independent expenditures . . . do not give 
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”103 
When the Supreme Court has spoken carelessly and without fully 
considering the implications of a statement, lower courts and the Court itself 
have found ways to say, with the legendary comedian Gilda Radner, “never 
mind.”  For example, early in the Citizens United opinion, the Court declared 
that the First Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among 
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not by others.”104  The Court 
apparently referred to all forms of speech, including political contributions 
and expenditures.  Two years after Citizens United, however, the Court 
summarily affirmed a lower court decision upholding a ban on political 
contributions and expenditures by noncitizens who are not permanent 
residents of the United States.105  The Court’s statement that the government 
may not restrict speech on the basis of a speaker’s identity evidently had 
become inoperative.106 
Citizens United said more narrowly, “[T]he Government cannot restrict 
political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”107  This statement 
in fact appeared to be Citizens United’s holding.  Taking the Court’s 
statement literally, however, would give corporations the same right as 
individuals to contribute to candidates, and the number of corporations an 
individual can form is unlimited.  A person should not be able to contribute 
101 times the individual contribution limit simply because he has created 100 
corporations.  Perhaps the Court did not consider fully the implications of its 
statement. 
 
 103. See, e.g., Nicholas Almendares & Catherine Hafer, Beyond Citizens United, 84 
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Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 437–38 (2012); 
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729–30 (2011). 
 104. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. 
 105. Bluman v. FEC, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (mem.), aff’g 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282–83 
(D.D.C. 2011). 
 106. See Inoperative, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 346 (rev. ed. 2008) (defining 
inoperative as “a correction without an apology, leaving the corrector in a deep hole”). 
 107. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346. 
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After Citizens United, four federal courts of appeals upheld Congress’s 
century-old prohibition of political contributions by corporations,108 and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in two of the cases.109  The declaration that 
“the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity” also seemed to have become inoperative. 
Lower courts and the Supreme Court itself have tempered a literal reading 
of Citizens United’s broad pronouncements with common sense.  The D.C. 
Circuit should have done the same thing in SpeechNow.  Instead, the court 
based its analysis of whether the Constitution guarantees the right to give $10 
million to a super PAC entirely on an imprecise Supreme Court dictum.  The 
court read this statement for all it might be worth and then some.  The 
Supreme Court’s dictum supplied the only support the lower court offered 
for its conclusion that contributions to super PACs cannot corrupt—not even 
a scintilla and not even when they lead to federal indictments for bribery. 
II.  THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES 
A.  Supreme Court Precedents 
In three cases, various Supreme Court Justices have spoken to the issue 
that the D.C. Circuit decided in SpeechNow—the validity of limiting 
contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures.  In one of 
these cases, the Court itself upheld limits on contributions to political parties 
to make independent expenditures, thus repudiating the SpeechNow 
syllogism. 
In California Medical Ass’n v. FEC,110 the Court upheld a limit on what a 
medical association could contribute to a PAC that made both independent 
expenditures and contributions to candidates—a conventional PAC, not a 
super PAC.111  Four dissenting Justices would not have reached the issue; 
they maintained that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
case.112 
The other five Justices upheld the contribution limit, but Justice Blackmun 
wrote in a concurring opinion that, if the PAC had been a super PAC rather 
than a conventional PAC, he would have voted to strike the limit down:  “[A] 
 
 108. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 877–80 (8th Cir. 
2012) (en banc); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2012); Ognibene v. 
Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2012); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 
1124–27 (9th Cir. 2011); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2010); 
see also Tillman Act, Pub. L. No 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907) (forbidding 
political contributions by corporations); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003) 
(upholding the ban on contributions by corporations—a decision that Citizens United did not 
discuss and probably did not mean to overrule). 
 109. Danielczyk v. United States, 568 U.S. 1193 (2013) (denying certiorari in Danielczyk, 
683 F.3d 611); Ognibene v. Parkes, 567 U.S. 935 (2012) (denying certiorari in Ognibene, 671 
F.3d 174). 
 110. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).   
 111. Id. at 201. 
 112. Id. at 207–08 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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different result would follow if [the contribution limit] were applied to 
contributions to a political committee established for the purpose of making 
independent expenditures, rather than contributions to candidates.”113 
The other four Justices who reached the merits did not join Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion, apparently because they took a different view.  Buckley 
treated contributions as low-value speech partly because “the transformation 
of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than 
the contributor.”114  The plurality opinion quoted this language, italicizing 
the words “speech by someone other than the contributor.”115  It observed 
that, although the medical association created the PAC to which it 
contributed, the PAC’s speech was not the association’s,116 and it declared, 
“‘[S]peech by proxy’ . . . is not the sort of political advocacy that this Court 
in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection.”117  The 
plurality’s analysis was as applicable to contributions to super PACs as it was 
to contributions to conventional PACs and to candidates. 
In Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I),118 the 
Supreme Court struck down a limit on expenditures by a political party.  The 
principal opinion by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, 
concluded that these expenditures were not coordinated with those of any 
candidate.  The opinion recognized, however, that, by contributing to an 
independent expenditure group like the party, donors could evade the limits 
on contributions to candidates.  Justice Breyer accordingly had no doubt that 
limits on contributions to independent-expenditure groups were valid: 
The greatest danger of corruption . . . appears to be from the ability of 
donors to give sums up to $20,000 to a party which may be used for 
independent . . . expenditures for the benefit of a particular candidate.  We 
could understand how Congress, were it to conclude that the potential for 
evasion of the individual contribution limits was a serious matter, might 
decide to change the statute’s limitations on contributions to political 
parties. . . .  But we do not believe that the risk of corruption present here 
could justify the “markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by” 
the statute’s limitations on expenditures.119 
In the most significant case of the trilogy, McConnell v. FEC,120 the Court 
itself addressed the issue.  McConnell upheld limits on the contribution of 
“soft money” to political parties—money the parties used for such purposes 
as turning out voters rather than advocating the election of identified 
candidates.121  The Court recited evidence that candidates valued and 
 
 113. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).   
 114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam).  
 115. Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 
 116. Id. at 196. 
 117. Id. 
 118. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). 
 119. Id. at 617 (Breyer, J.) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44).   
 120. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 121. Id. at 101.  McConnell also upheld Congress’s prohibition of electioneering 
communications by corporations and labor unions. Id. at 203–09.  Citizens United overruled 
McConnell on this point, but it did not question McConnell’s holding that limits on soft-money 
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encouraged soft-money contributions (just as they now value and encourage 
super PAC contributions), but nothing in McConnell indicated that soft-
money expenditures were coordinated with expenditures made by the 
candidates’ own campaigns. 
In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the lack of coordination was 
crucial.  As the majority summarized his view, Congress could restrict only 
“contributions made at the express behest of, and expenditures made in 
coordination with, a federal officeholder or candidate.”122  Justice Kennedy 
wrote, “[I]ndependent party activity, which by definition includes 
independent receipt and spending of soft money, lacks a possibility for quid 
pro quo corruption of federal officeholders.”123  His view would block 
Congress from limiting soft-money contributions to parties and also would 
block Congress from limiting contributions to super PACs unless they were 
made at the behest of a candidate.  The Court, however, in an opinion written 
jointly by Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor, rejected Justice Kennedy’s 
position, calling it “crabbed” and declaring that it ignored “precedent, 
common sense, and the realities of political fundraising.”124  In the course of 
its discussion, the Court observed in a footnote that Congress could validly 
limit contributions made for the purpose of funding “express advocacy and 
numerous other noncoordinated expenditures.”125 
In SpeechNow, the D.C. Circuit made no effort to distinguish limits on 
contributions to super PACs from the limits on soft-money contributions 
McConnell upheld.126  After Citizens United, moreover, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed McConnell’s holding that these contribution limits are valid.127 
 
contributions are valid. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319.  The Court in fact reaffirmed this 
central holding of McConnell not long after it decided Citizens United. Republican Nat’l 
Comm. v. FEC, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010) (mem.), aff’g 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 122. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152 (citing id. at 290–93, 298–99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
 123. Id. at 301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).   
 124. Id. at 152 (majority opinion). 
 125. Id. at 152 n.48; see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) 
(noting that if a nonprofit corporation’s independent electoral expenditures became 
sufficiently extensive, the corporation would be subject to various statutory obligations, 
including the obligation to accept only limited contributions).   
 126. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  The court did 
maintain that Citizens United abandoned McConnell’s definition of corruption, id. at 694, and 
perhaps it believed that McConnell’s “soft money” ruling depended on this definition. Lower 
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implicitly overruled. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237–38 (1997).  Moreover, 
on the same day that the D.C. Circuit decided SpeechNow, a three-judge federal district court 
in the District of Columbia held that McConnell’s approval of the limits on soft money 
contributions survived Citizens United. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 
162 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010) (No. 09-1287).  The Supreme Court later 
summarily affirmed the three-judge court’s ruling. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 561 U.S. 
1040 (2010) (mem.).   
A recent decision by another three-judge panel in the District of Columbia maintained that 
McConnell differed from SpeechNow because the relationship between candidates and parties 
is closer than that between candidates and super PACs. Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 219 
F. Supp. 3d 86, 98 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017) (No. 16-865). 
 127. See generally Republican Nat’l Comm., 561 U.S. 1040, aff’g 698 F. Supp. 2d 150.  
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas—but notably, not Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito—dissented from the Court’s summary affirmance. 
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B.  Are Contributions to Super PACs Really Contributions? 
Although the principal opinions in California Medical Ass’n and Colorado 
I and the opinion of the Court in McConnell strongly indicate that Congress 
may limit contributions to independent expenditure groups, Justice 
Blackmun in California Medical Ass’n and Justice Kennedy in McConnell 
contended that Congress may limit only contributions to candidates and 
groups whose spending candidates can influence—in other words, that only 
contributions to candidates qualify as contributions.  When a group’s 
expenditures are coordinated with those of a candidate, the expenditures 
become contributions to the candidate.128  And if expenditures become 
contributions when they are “coordinated,” perhaps contributions become 
expenditures when they are “uncoordinated”—when no candidate can 
influence how they are spent.  Concluding that contributions to super PACs 
are not truly contributions—that they are in fact expenditures—would 
provide an alternate basis for the ruling in SpeechNow.129 
If the distinction between contributions and expenditures rested on the 
proposition that candidates cannot be corrupted by funds given to and spent 
by others, this alternate rationale for SpeechNow would make sense.  That 
proposition, however, is plainly false, and it was not in fact the basis for the 
Supreme Court’s distinction. 
If the proposition were true, someone would need to tell former Alabama 
Governor Don Siegelman, who recently spent more than six years in federal 
prison for bribery.130  Siegelman allegedly appointed someone to a state 
board in return for a contribution to a group supporting a referendum he 
favored—a contribution that did not benefit him personally.131  As this 
Article noted in its discussion of the charges against Senator Menendez and 
Dr. Melgen, an official cannot avoid a charge of corruption by saying, “Please 
pay the money to the Red Cross or my alter-ego super PAC.”132 
In Buckley, the Supreme Court did not endorse the untenable view that 
candidates cannot be corrupted by money paid to and spent by others.  Instead 
it noted several differences between contributions and expenditures.  One 
difference, to be sure, was that money given to a candidate tends to be more 
corrupting than money spent on his behalf by someone else. 
 
 128. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (a)(7)(B)(i) (2012); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. FEC (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 438 (2001) (“Expenditures coordinated with a 
candidate . . . are contributions under the Act.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 36–37, 46–47, 
78 (1976) (per curiam). 
 129. But see infra note 144 (noting that, even if contributions to super PACs could be 
regarded as expenditures, many of them could not be regarded as independent expenditures).   
 130. See Bryan Lyman, Former Alabama Gov. Don Siegelman Released from Prison, 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/ 
news/politics/southunionstreet/2017/02/08/former-alabama-gov-don-siegelman-released-
prison/97644094/ [https://perma.cc/92G2-SC6Y].  
 131. See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1169 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
Siegelman’s conviction while acknowledging that “contributions to [issue-advocacy 
campaigns] do not financially benefit the individual politician in the same way that a 
candidate-election campaign contribution does”).  
 132. See supra Part I.A.  
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The Court offered three reasons for concluding that direct contributions 
have less communicative value than independent expenditures and two 
reasons for concluding that contributions are more corrupting.  An 
examination of these reasons reveals that contributions to super PACs are 
indeed contributions, not expenditures.  These contributions cannot 
reasonably be distinguished from the contributions to candidates whose 
limitation Buckley upheld. 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Reasons for Treating 
Contributions as Low-Value Speech 
All of Buckley’s reasons for treating contributions as low-value speech 
apply fully to contributions to super PACs. 
First, the Court said, “A contribution serves as a general expression of 
support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the 
underlying basis for the support.”133  Equally, a contribution to a super PAC 
does not convey the underlying basis for the contributor’s support. 
Second, the Court said that “the transformation of contributions into 
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”134  
Transforming a contribution to a super PAC into political debate also 
“involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” 
Third, the Court said, limiting the amount of an individual’s contribution 
“permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but 
does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates 
and issues.”135  Again, contributions to super PACs are no different.  Limiting 
a contribution to a super PAC allows the contribution to serve as an 
expression of support but does not limit a contributor’s freedom to discuss 
candidates and issues. 
The strongest of the Court’s reasons for treating contributions as low-value 
speech was probably its observation that transforming contributions into 
debate “involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”  Although 
Buckley rejected the bumper-sticker view that “money is not speech,”136 it 
recognized that writing a check is not entitled to the same First Amendment 
protection as actually speaking.  The four-Justice plurality in California 
Medical Ass’n saw this passage of the Buckley opinion as crucial.  Their 
opinion declared, “‘[S]peech by proxy’ . . . is not the sort of political 
advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.”137 
 
 133. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.   
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.   
 136. Id. at 15–17.  The Court noted that one cannot publish a newspaper or send a telegram 
without spending money.  Justice Alito has called it “very frustrating” for a Supreme Court 
opinion to be “reduced to a slogan that you put on a bumper sticker.” LAURENCE TRIBE & 
JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE:  THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 96 (2014).  
 137. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).  The weakest of the Court’s reasons for treating contributions as low-
value speech was probably its statement that a contribution limit “permits the symbolic 
expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the 
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The Supreme Court’s refusal to subject contribution limits to strict scrutiny 
rested on its conclusion that contributions have limited communicative value.  
Although the Court discussed the strength of the government’s anticorruption 
interest as well, the intensity of this interest bears on whether a contribution 
or expenditure limit satisfies strict scrutiny or some other standard, not what 
the standard should be.  As the Court explained in FEC v. Beaumont,138 
[T]he level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the “political activity 
at issue” to effective speech or political association. . . .  [R]estrictions on 
political contributions have been treated as merely “marginal” speech 
restrictions subject to relatively complaisant review under the First 
Amendment, because contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core 
of political expression.139 
Contributions to super PACs have no greater communicative value than 
contributions to candidates.  Like contributions to candidates, these 
contributions differ from expenditures and “lie closer to the edges than to the 
core of political expression.” 
D.  The Supreme Court’s Reasons for Treating 
Contributions as More Corrupting than Expenditures 
In addition to its three reasons for treating contributions to candidates as 
low-value speech, Buckley offered two reasons for viewing these 
contributions as more corrupting than independent expenditures.  First, it 
said, “The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure 
with the candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will 
be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”140  
Second, the Court said that independent expenditures tend to be less valuable 
to candidates.  It wrote, “[I]ndependent advocacy . . . does not presently 
appear to pose any dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those 
identified with large campaign contributions.”141  Moreover, “independent 
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign 
and indeed may prove counterproductive.”142 
The rules forbidding the coordination of a super PAC’s expenditures with 
those of a candidate limit what advice candidates can give to super PAC 
 
contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.  The Court 
elaborated, “The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly 
with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, 
symbolic act of contributing.” Id.  A contributor might be surprised to learn that writing a 
check to a campaign for the maximum permissible amount—a check for thousands of 
dollars—is merely “symbolic support.”  Contributions merit a degree of First Amendment 
protection not only because these contributions constitute symbolic speech by the people who 
make them but also, and more importantly, because they bring the political speech of others 
to an audience.  The larger the contribution, the more speech it is likely to facilitate (as well 
as the more illegitimate influence it is likely to have). 
 138. 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
 139. Id. at 161 (citations omitted) (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 
238, 259 (1986)). 
 140. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.  
 141. Id. at 46. 
 142. Id. at 47. 
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managers, but they do not limit what candidates can say to super PAC donors.  
If candidates wish to tell donors how they wish super PAC funds to be spent, 
they may do so freely, as long as the donors do not then act as the candidates’ 
agents by conveying their wishes to the people who will actually determine 
how the funds are spent.143  And if candidates wish to advise donors how 
their own funds should be spent—namely, by donating them to the super 
PAC—again they may do so within limits.144  The possibility of 
prearrangement and coordination does not distinguish contributions to super 
PACs from contributions to candidates. 
Buckley’s claim that the absence of prearrangement and coordination 
reduces the likelihood of improper commitments by candidates is 
unconvincing in any event.  People willing to violate the law against bribery 
are usually willing to violate the law forbidding the coordination of electoral 
expenditures as well.  Neither law bars a candidate from meeting with 
supporters, and when a candidate and a supporter have lunch, they may 
whisper about coordinating expenditures, bribes, and, if they like, robbing 
banks.  It is difficult to see how the law forbidding the coordination of 
electoral expenditures reduces the likelihood of bribery in the slightest.145 
The more important of Buckley’s reasons for regarding independent 
expenditures as less corrupting than contributions was that expenditures 
usually have less value to a candidate.  Buckley’s approval of this reason, 
however, was tentative:  “[I]ndependent advocacy . . . does not presently 
appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those 
identified with large campaign contributions.”146  The court added that 
“independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the 
candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.”147 
Experience in the years since Buckley has called the Court’s provisional 
judgment into question.  When Buckley noted that independent expenditures 
might provide little assistance to a candidate and might prove 
counterproductive, the Court probably did not foresee super PACs that spend 
 
 143. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20(a)–.21(a) (2018). 
 144. See FEC, Advisory Opinion 2011-12, supra note 9.  Even if one were to envision 
contributions to super PACs as expenditures rather than contributions, many would not be 
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 145. To put the point differently, Buckley maintained that people who observe the law 
restricting the coordination of electoral expenditures will have limited opportunities to engage 
in bribery.  But if one is willing to assume that people obey the law forbidding the coordination 
of expenditures, one should also assume that people obey the law against bribery.  And, if 
people obey the law against bribery, the problem vanishes.  People who obey the law 
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 146. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
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more than the candidates they support,148 that are managed by candidates’ 
former campaign managers and other experienced political operatives,149 and 
that may be ceded responsibility for all of a campaign’s advertising.150  The 
Court’s judgment that, other things being equal, a candidate would prefer to 
control campaign expenditures himself is no doubt sound, but post-Buckley 
experience has suggested that other things often are not equal.  There is a 
strong advantage to having messages sent on one’s behalf for which one need 
take no responsibility. 
Without examining post-Buckley experience and without knowing what 
super PACs would become, Citizens United settled by fiat the empirical 
question Buckley left open.  After declaring the anticorruption interest 
insufficient to justify any restriction of independent expenditures,151 it made 
the sweeping pronouncement that is the focus of much of this Article:  “[W]e 
now conclude that independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption 
or the appearance of corruption.”152 
Perhaps, as Buckley tentatively postulated and as Citizens United 
proclaimed, independent expenditures are less corrupting than direct 
contributions to candidates.  Of the five reasons Buckley offered for 
distinguishing independent expenditures from contributions, only this last 
one may also distinguish contributions to super PACs from contributions to 
candidates.  A candidate may value a $5500 contribution to a super PAC 
urging his election less than a $5500 contribution to his own campaign. 
But how much less?  In a post-Citizens United decision, McCutcheon v. 
FEC,153 four members of the Citizens United majority joined a plurality 
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts.  This opinion reiterated Buckley’s 
statement that “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an 
expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . . undermines the value of the 
expenditure to the candidate” and then acknowledged “[b]ut probably not by 
95 percent.”154  Similarly, a candidate might value a $5500 contribution to a 
super PAC less than a $5500 contribution to his own campaign, but “probably 
not by 95 percent.”  A $1 million super PAC contribution produces vastly 
more corruption or appearance of corruption than a $5500 campaign 
 
 148. See Note, supra note 9, at 1484 (“Super PACs are often able to outspend the candidates 
they support . . . .”). 
 149. See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 394 & n.23 (noting that the managers of Restore Our 
Future, the principal super PAC supporting Governor Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign, 
included the political director of Romney’s 2008 presidential campaign and the counsel and 
chief financial officer of Romney’s 2008 campaign—and that Priorities USA Action, the 
principal super PAC supporting President Obama, was also managed by people close to him). 
 150. See Peter Overby et al., As Bush Campaign Goes Down, the Knives Come Out, NPR 
(Feb. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/23/467745559/where-did-all-that-jeb-
bush-superpac-money-go [https://perma.cc/LNB4-LBWS] (noting that the official campaign 
committee for presidential candidate Jeb Bush “essentially outsourced its media operation to 
the supposedly independent superPAC”).  
 151. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
 152. Id.  
 153. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).   
 154. Id. at 1454 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357). 
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contribution can yield.155  If Congress may prohibit the campaign 
contribution (as it may and has), it should be allowed to prohibit the super 
PAC contribution as well.  If Buckley still stands (and Citizens United says it 
does), SpeechNow was wrongly decided.  Contributions to super PACs 
cannot reasonably be distinguished from the contributions to candidates 
whose limitation Buckley upheld. 
E.  Why Contributions and Expenditures Are Not Fungible:  
The False Allure of the Hydraulic Hypothesis 
One might suppose that, if wealthy people could not contribute unlimited 
sums to super PACs, they would use the same funds to make independent 
expenditures.  They would substitute fully protected “speech” for “speech by 
proxy.”  But they probably wouldn’t. 
Some skeptics have embraced what one might call the hydraulic 
hypothesis.  As the Supreme Court itself once declared, “Money, like water, 
will always find an outlet.”156  The proponents of this hypothesis, however, 
have offered little evidence to support it.157  If it were true, SpeechNow could 
not have changed the world.  Before SpeechNow, the people who now make 
multimillion dollar contributions to super PACs would have made 
multimillion dollar independent expenditures instead.  Even expenditures 
approaching $1 million by people other than candidates, however, seem to 
 
 155. See Edward B. Foley, The “Major Purpose” Test:  Distinguishing Between Election-
Focused and Issue-Focused Groups, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 341, 346 (2004) (“[W]hen a political 
committee is focused on electing one particular candidate[,] . . . a large-dollar gift to that 
political committee is almost as good as a large-dollar gift to the candidate’s own campaign 
would be as a means to secure improper favoritism from that candidate once in office.”).  
 156. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 
558 U.S. 310; see FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 519 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (confessing that Justice Marshall erred in Buckley when he endorsed 
the distinction between contributions and expenditures because, in his view, when the ability 
to make direct contributions is limited, people “will find other ways to financially benefit the 
candidate’s campaign”); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“[P]olitical money, like 
water, has to go somewhere.  It never really disappears into thin air.”). 
 157. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM:  SOBERING 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 79 (1998) (“Most [interest groups] 
have shown little interest in getting around contribution limits.”).  Although most interest 
groups may not take advantage of loopholes and workarounds, Malbin and Gais show that 
many groups do.  Loopholes and workarounds matter, and we do not propose ignoring them.  
We question only the hypothesis that donors always find a workaround so that contribution 
limits become futile.  We note in addition that large independent expenditures by individuals 
are an especially unattractive and unlikely workaround. 
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have been extremely rare.  We know of none at all.158  After SpeechNow, 
“large contributions by individuals . . . skyrocketed.”159 
Just as wealthy people apparently did not make large independent political 
expenditures before SpeechNow, they would be unlikely to make these 
expenditures if the pre-SpeechNow regime were restored.  Spending millions 
of political dollars effectively requires an organization, one employing 
people with a variety of skills.  If a wealthy person were to establish such an 
organization as a distinct legal entity, this organization would be called a 
super PAC.  A person who funded this organization would engage in “speech 
by proxy,” and his contribution could be limited. 
A wealthy person might employ a personal staff to aid him in making 
independent expenditures as an individual.  He then would face unlimited 
liability for the torts and breaches of contract committed by staff members in 
the course of their employment; he would be required to take personal 
responsibility for the advertisements they placed (“I’m Bobby Billionaire, 
and I approve this message.”); and one of the dubious things Buckley said 
about independent expenditures might become true:  “Unlike 
contributions, . . . independent expenditures may well provide little 
assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove 
counterproductive.”160  Even if this person could find and employ capable 
managers, the enterprise would require his personal attention.  We suspect 
that few of the billionaires willing to write large checks to super PACs are 
willing to manage political organizations themselves. 
Contributions to super PACs have advantages over independent 
expenditures apart from the fact that they save contributors from the need to 
manage political organizations and take personal responsibility for the 
messages they send.  An early contribution to a super PAC ensures that funds 
will be available throughout a campaign.  A promise to make independent 
expenditures throughout a campaign is less reliable.  The independent 
spender’s promise may not be kept, especially if the benefitted candidacy 
starts to founder.  Moreover, a contributor may feel freer to discuss policy 
(i.e., what he wants) with a candidate after making a contribution to a super 
PAC than he would if he were making continuing expenditures on the 
candidate’s behalf.  When an irrevocable donation precedes an “ask,” the 
 
 158. Candidates did sometimes fund their own campaigns, but, as Buckley noted, a 
candidate who makes expenditures on his own behalf does not corrupt himself. See Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53–54 (1976) (per curiam). 
Independent expenditures provided one lawful way around contribution limits prior to 
SpeechNow, and donations to 527, 501(c)(4), and 501(c)(6) groups provided others. See I.R.C. 
§§ 527, 501(c)(4), 501(c)(6) (2012).  Donations to these groups, however, were less effective 
than direct contributions to candidates both in bringing messages to the public and in buying 
clout. See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 455–56. 
 159. Alschuler, supra note 33, at 423. 
 160. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. 
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donation is not conditioned on receiving the desired response, and criminal 
prosecution becomes less likely.161 
III.  THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION 
A.  Wealth Disparity, Mistrust, and Corruption 
Trust is a social good to be protected . . . .  When it is damaged, the 
community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and 
collapse. 
—Sissela Bok162 
For more than forty years, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may 
restrict political contributions to prevent corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.  This Part examines the appearance of corruption that unlimited 
super PAC contributions have produced.  The material it presents should be 
viewed against the background of America’s large and growing disparity in 
the distribution of wealth and the lack of social trust that invariably 
accompanies a high level of economic inequality. 
In 2011, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz published an 
influential article entitled “Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%.”163  Here’s how 
it began: 
It’s no use pretending that what has obviously happened has not in fact 
happened.  The upper 1 percent of Americans are now taking in nearly a 
quarter of the nation’s income every year.  In terms of wealth rather than 
income, the top 1 percent control 40 percent.  Their lot in life has improved 
considerably.  Twenty-five years ago, the corresponding figures were 12 
percent and 33 percent. . . .  While the top 1 percent have seen their incomes 
rise 18 percent over the past decade, those in the middle have actually seen 
their incomes fall.  For men with only high-school degrees, the decline has 
been precipitous—12 percent in the last quarter-century alone.  All the 
growth in recent decades—and more—has gone to those at the top.  In 
terms of income equality, America lags behind [every] country in . . . 
Europe . . . . 
. . . [T]he vast inequalities that seemed so troubling in the mid-19th 
century . . . are but a pale shadow of what we are seeing in America 
today.164 
Some additional data: 
 
 161. But see Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption:  Why Broad Definitions of Bribery 
Make Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 479–82 (2015) (discussing “stream of 
benefits” or “course of conduct” bribery). 
 162. SISSELA BOK, LYING:  MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 26–27 (1978). 
 163. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%, VANITY FAIR (May 2011), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105 [https://perma.cc/GH77-
9FWS].  
 164. Id.  Stiglitz’s article observed that popular protests were occurring throughout the 
world in places where a small fraction of the population controlled most of the wealth and 
where corruption had become a way of life. He wrote, “As we gaze out at the popular fervor 
in the streets, one question to ask ourselves is this:  When will it come to America?” Id.  
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 Although the richest 1 percent of Americans in 2013 received about 
20 percent of all income (slightly more than the top 1 percent did in 
the era of Rockefeller and Carnegie), they received only around 10 
percent in the decades from 1950 to 1980.165  A “great compression” 
occurred mostly during World War II, and it produced a “middle 
class society” that endured for three decades.166  Among the possible 
causes of increased inequality since then have been less progressive 
taxation; less powerful labor unions; an increased number of women 
entering the workforce at low wages; a minimum wage that lagged 
behind inflation; the export of manufacturing jobs; automation; 
greater direct and regulatory subsidization of manufacturing, 
banking, and insurance; greater protection of software and 
pharmaceutical patents; greater protection of entertainment-industry 
copyrights; and protective land-use policies and licensing 
requirements.  In recent decades, shareholders, top managers, 
financial service providers, elite lawyers, and some health-care 
providers have captured nearly all gains from increased productivity 
and trade.167  In 2016, inequality in the distribution of both wealth 
 
 165. See EMMANUEL SAEZ, STRIKING IT RICHER:  THE EVOLUTION OF TOP INCOMES IN THE 
UNITED STATES fig.2 (2015), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7G4Y-YWSE].   
Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman report:   
The average pre-tax income of the bottom 50% of adults since 1980 has stagnated 
at about $16,000 per adult (in constant 2014 dollars, using the national income 
deflator) . . . .  As a result, the bottom 50% income share has collapsed from about 
20% in 1980 to 12% in 2014.  In the meantime, the average pre-tax income of top 
1% adults rose from $420,000 to about $1.3 million, and their income share 
increased from about 12% in the early 1980s to 20% in 2014. . . .  In 1980, top 1% 
adults earned on average 27 times more than bottom 50% adults before tax, while 
today they earn 81 times more. 
 
. . . [G]overnment redistribution has offset only a small fraction of the increase in 
pre-tax inequality.   
Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National Accounts:  Methods and Estimates for the 
United States 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22945, 2016), 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/Piketty-Saez-ZucmanNBER16.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ9E-
WR5J]. 
 166. See generally Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression:  The Wage 
Structure in the United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1992) (discussing the rapid 
compression in the wage structure during the 1940’s and its maintenance during the 
subsequent decade and more). 
 167. See Jonathan Rothwell, Myths of the 1 Percent:  What Puts People at the Top, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/upshot/income-inequality-
united-states.html [https://perma.cc/MWW2-MCDH]; Causes of Income Inequality, SEVEN 
PILLARS INST. (Jan. 22, 2015), https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/causes-economic-inequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/XK9S-UKR2].  For further discussion of the causes of increased inequality, 
see generally DEAN BAKER, RIGGED:  HOW GLOBALIZATION AND THE RULES OF THE MODERN 
ECONOMY WERE STRUCTURED TO MAKE THE RICH RICHER (2016); BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN 
M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY:  HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN 
GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY (2017); RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS:  HOW 
THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS 
A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2017).  
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and income was greater than it had been at any point in a study period 
encompassing the previous fifty-four years.168 
 In 2011, the net worth of America’s wealthiest 400 individuals 
exceeded the net worth of half of all American households.169 
 The six heirs of Wal-Mart’s founder have as much wealth as the 
bottom 41.5 percent of all Americans.170 
 Fifty years ago, the average compensation of the CEOs of the largest 
U.S. firms was twenty times greater than that of the average U.S. 
worker.  It is 200 or 300 times greater today.171 
 The United States is “the most unequal rich country on earth” not 
only because its rich are especially rich but also because, among 
developed countries, its poor are especially poor.172 
 
 168. Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962–2016:  Has 
Middle Class Wealth Recovered? 36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
24085, 2017), http://papers.nber.org/tmp/7707-w24085.pdf [https://perma.cc/GNA9-G4TA].  
A Washington Post columnist noted that “the top 1 percent of households own more wealth 
than the bottom 90 percent combined” and that the top 1 percent’s share of total American 
wealth (40 percent) is twice the top 1 percent’s share in France, the United Kingdom, or 
Canada. Christopher Ingraham, The Richest 1 Percent Now Owns More of the Country’s 
Wealth than at Any Time in the Past 50 Years, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/06/the-richest-1-percent-now-
owns-more-of-the-countrys-wealth-than-at-any-time-in-the-past-50-years [https://perma.cc/ 
9AH3-FEBA].   
 169. Politifact Wisconsin reviewed the relevant sources and spoke with several respected 
economists after filmmaker Michael Moore made this claim in 2011, and it rated the claim 
True.  For its review of the sources, see Tom Kertscher, Michael Moore Says 400 Americans 
Have More Wealth than Half of All Americans Combined, POLITIFACT WIS. (Mar. 10, 2011, 
4:16 PM), http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2011/mar/10/michael-
moore/michael-moore-says-400-americans-have-more-wealth-/ [https://perma.cc/HE7G-
GBT9].  A 2017 report makes an even more striking claim:  “The three wealthiest people in 
the United States—Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, and Warren Buffett—now own more wealth than 
the entire bottom half of the American population combined.” CHUCK COLLINS & JOSH HOXIE, 
INST. FOR POL’Y STUDIES, BILLIONAIRE BONANZA:  THE FORBES 400 AND THE REST OF US 2 
(2017), http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/BILLIONAIRE-BONANZA-
2017-FinalV.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBH6-H7FJ].  
 170. Again, Politifact Wisconsin did impressive research after an advocacy group made this 
claim, and it rated the claim True. Tom Kertscher, Just How Wealthy Is the Wal-Mart Walton 
Family?, POLITIFACT WIS. (Dec. 8, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/ 
statements/2013/dec/08/one-wisconsin-now/just-how-wealthy-wal-mart-walton-family/ 
[https://perma.cc/KV4S-3DHF]. 
 171. Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, Top CEOs Make 300 Times More than Typical 
Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 21, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/top-ceos-make-
300-times-more-than-workers-pay-growth-surpasses-market-gains-and-the-rest-of-the-0-1-
percent/ [https://perma.cc/7ZXE-2HLA]; see Executive Paywatch, AFL-CIO, 
https://aflcio.org/paywatch [https://perma.cc/H47M-VN5C] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) 
(reporting that in 2016 the average compensation of the CEOs of S&P 500 Index companies 
was 347 times greater than the compensation of the average American worker).  Although the 
300-to-1 figure is the one most commonly cited, some maintain that the ratio of CEO-to-
worker compensation at the largest firms is as low as 200 to 1. See Glenn Kessler, Clinton’s 
Claim That CEOs Make 300 Times More than American Workers, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/16/clintons-claim-
that-ceos-make-300-times-more-than-american-workers/ [https://perma.cc/6UZU-B6ER]. 
 172. Jonathan Fisher & Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Inequality, PATHWAYS, Special 
Issue 2016, at 32, 34, 36, http://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways-SOTU-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTB6-HDYB].  The poorest 10 percent of the U.S. population has 
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Social trust is strongly correlated with equality in the distribution of 
wealth.  This trust is typically measured by responses to the survey question, 
“Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”173  In the nations in which social 
trust is highest, more than 60 percent of respondents say that most people can 
be trusted.  These nations are the most equal in the distribution of wealth—
places like Norway, Sweden, and Finland.  In the nations in which social trust 
is lowest, fewer than 10 percent say that most people can be trusted.  These 
nations are among the least equal—places like Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, 
and Peru.174  Studies employing multivariate analysis in various settings 
confirm what the raw figures suggest—that economic inequality is a strong 
predictor of mistrust.175 
Studies of changing attitudes over time show the same pattern as studies 
of geographical variation.  As wealth disparities increased in America, the 
proportion of Americans who believe that most people can be trusted fell—
from 46 percent in 1972 through 1974 to 33 percent in 2010 through 2012.176  
Trust levels are positively correlated with wealth as well as with equality, but 
the United States now departs from the pattern.  Although the United States 
ranks high among developed nations in median household income, it ranks 
low among these nations in social trust.177 
Trust is a major component of what economists, sociologists, and political 
scientists call social capital.  The political scientist Eric Uslander explains: 
Trust is the chicken soup of social life.  It reputedly brings us all sorts of 
good things—from a willingness to get involved in our communities to 
higher rates of economic growth, to satisfaction with government 
performance, to making daily life more pleasant. . . .  An active and engaged 
 
more real income per capita than the poorest 10 percent in Italy, but it has less per capita 
income than the poorest 10 percent in Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia. Id. at 34.  
 173. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND SOCIAL TRUST:  WHO, WHERE AND 
WHY 1 (2007), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/SocialTrust.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XME-E4XZ].   
 174. See Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Max Roser, Trust, OUR WORLD DATA, 
https://ourworldindata.org/trust [https://perma.cc/4HDT-EBRH] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) 
(describing levels of trust); Richard Wilkinson, How Economic Inequality Harms Societies, 
TED (July 2011), https://www.ted.com/talks/richard_wilkinson/transcript 
[https://perma.cc/VH6S-8ZC4] (describing the correlation between trust and levels of 
economic equality).   
 175. See Bo Rothstein & Eric M. Uslaner, All for All:  Equality, Corruption, and Social 
Trust, 58 WORLD POL. 41, 48 (2005); Henrik Jordahl, Inequality and Trust 17 (Research Inst. 
of Indus. Econ., Working Paper No. 715, 2007), http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp715.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6RPA-65CX] (reviewing the empirical literature and declaring that the 
“relationship shows up consistently in different studies, although in a few of them it is not 
statistically significant”). 
 176. Jean M. Twenge et al., Declines in Trust in Others and Confidence in Institutions 
Among American Adults and Late Adolescents, 1972–2012, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1914, 1918 (2014).   
 177. Lila Shapiro, Money and Trust:  Richer, More Equal Countries Are More Trusting, 
Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 21, 2011, 4:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/04/20/trust-wealth_n_851519.html [https://perma.cc/MX4Q-EB5S].  
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citizenry is motivated by a shared sense of common purpose that ultimately 
helps people find compromises to difficult issues.178 
Resentment of “the 1 percent” by a significant part of “the 99 percent” may 
rest partly on jealousy of their mansions, but our guess is that it stems much 
more from the perception that “the 1 percent” have bought government favors 
and made government less democratic.  The $2.7 million electric train set in 
Robert Mercer’s basement probably troubles people less than the perception 
that “Mercer has surrounded [President Trump] with his people, and his 
people have an outsized influence over the running of our country, simply 
because Robert Mercer paid for their seats.”179 
As trust in other people has declined, trust in government has too.  The 
percentage of Americans who believed they could trust the federal 
government most of the time was 77 percent in 1964.  It is 19 percent 
today.180  In 1964, only 29 percent of respondents said that the government 
was “pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.”181  
Now more than three-quarters take that view.182  A University of Maryland 
survey conducted during the 2016 presidential campaign reported in fact that 
92 percent of registered voters (96 percent of Trump supporters and 87 
percent of Clinton supporters) believed that the government was “pretty 
much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.”  This figure had 
increased from 81 percent only six years earlier.183  The perceived capture of 
government by a wealthy minority contributes to the belief that the system of 
economic distribution is unfair.  Middle-income Americans may bristle at 
revelations that many of the superrich pay taxes at a lower rate than they do184 
and that the federal program for providing medical care to seniors is 
prohibited by law from seeking lower drug prices.185 
 
 178. Eric M. Uslaner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569, 569 (2000).  
 179. Magerman, supra note 68 (op-ed by an executive of Robert Mercer’s hedge fund); see 
Jane Mayer, The Reclusive Hedge-Fund Tycoon Behind the Trump Presidency:  How Robert 
Mercer Exploited America’s Populist Insurgency, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 2017), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/the-reclusive-hedge-fund-tycoon-behind-
the-trump-presidency [https://perma.cc/B75B-85A9].  
 180. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 12, at 18. 
 181. Id. at 26. 
 182. Id. at 35.  
 183. VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, VOTER ANGER WITH GOVERNMENT AND THE 2016 ELECTION 5 
(2016), http://vop.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Dissatisfaction_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YLJ3-JGFG].  
 184. See, e.g., Warren E. Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html 
[https://perma.cc/ER7D-3PDP] (“[W]hat I paid was only 17.4 percent of my taxable income—
and that’s actually a lower percentage than was paid by any of the other 20 people in our 
office. . . .  My friends and I have been coddled long enough by a billionaire-friendly 
Congress.”).  
 185. See Theodore T. Lee et al., The Politics of Medicare and Drug-Price Negotiation 
(Updated), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/09/19/the-
politics-of-medicare-and-drug-price-negotiation/ [https://perma.cc/D3GV-GRHC].  
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Government corruption—broadly defined as the capture of government by 
special interests186—seems to make everyone angry, from the Tea Party 
through the Occupy movement.  Other than opposition to terrorism, 
corruption may be the only issue that unites all of America.187 
A 2012 Gallup survey found that 87 percent of Americans regard 
“reducing corruption in the federal government” as either extremely 
important or very important, placing this goal slightly behind “creating good 
jobs” but ahead of dealing with terrorism and other international threats, 
reducing the federal budget deficit, ensuring the long-term stability of Social 
Security and Medicare, improving the nation’s public schools, making health 
care available and affordable, overcoming political gridlock, making college 
education available and affordable, and dealing with environmental concerns 
such as global warming.188  A 2015 Gallup survey reported that 75 percent 
of Americans view government corruption as “widespread,” an increase from 
67 percent in 2007.189 
Empirical studies validate the belief that our government responds more to 
the agendas of wealthy elites than to the desires of the majority.  Martin 
Gilens and Benjamin Page write: 
In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at 
least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes.  
When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with 
organized interests, they generally lose . . . .  [E]ven when fairly large 
majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get 
it.190 
 
 186. See ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 114 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1920) (“The true forms of 
government . . . are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the 
common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest . . . are 
perversions.”).   
 187. Cf. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 (2014) (“When the 
rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income, . . . capitalism 
automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the 
meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based.”); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE 
CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION:  WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR 
REPUBLIC 5 (2017) (declaring that “the basic foundation upon which our middle-class 
constitution was built—the prerequisite of relative economic equality—is crumbling” and 
asking whether “our constitutional system [can] survive the collapse of the middle class”).   
 188. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Want Next President to Prioritize Jobs, Corruption, 
GALLUP (July 30, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/156347/Americans-Next-President-
Prioritize-Jobs-Corruption.aspx [https://perma.cc/FDT8-5ECX].  
 189. 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-corruption.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XDJ4-JEPV].  A Chapman University survey in 2015 found that more 
Americans were afraid or very afraid of government corruption than were afraid of terrorist 
attacks, cyber terrorism, bio-warfare, or economic collapse. Sheri Ledbetter, What Americans 
Fear Most—Chapman University’s Second Annual Survey of American Fears Released, 
CHAPMAN U. PRESS ROOM (Oct. 13, 2015), https://blogs.chapman.edu/press-room/2015/ 
10/13/what-americans-fear-most-chapman-universitys-second-annual-survey-of-american-
fears-released/ [https://perma.cc/AX57-RWWW]. 
 190. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:  Elites, 
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 564, 576 (2014); see also 
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Critics Argued with Our Analysis of U.S. Political 
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Many other studies have made similar findings.191 
Before Congress approved the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, 
Representative Chris Collins told the press, “My donors are basically saying, 
‘Get it done or don’t ever call me again.’”192  A review of opinion polls calls 
the Tax Cut and Jobs Act “the most unpopular major piece of legislation to 
pass in decades.”193 
B.  Defining Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption 
Citizens United took a narrow view of corruption.  The Supreme Court 
declared, “When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest 
was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”194  The Court said that 
“[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption,”195 and “[t]he fact that 
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean 
that these officials are corrupt.”196  In fact, “[t]he practices Buckley noted 
would be covered by bribery laws if a quid pro quo arrangement were 
proved.”197 
Four Supreme Court Justices have called these statements dicta,198 and if 
the holding of Citizens United is that “the Government cannot restrict 
political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity,”199 these Justices 
were correct.  None of the Court’s statements concerning cognizable 
corruption advanced the Court’s holding in any way. 
Nevertheless, in the discussion that follows, this Article accepts all of the 
Court’s dicta but one.  When we say that super PAC contributions create the 
appearance of corruption, we mean quid pro quo corruption, and we do not 
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include ingratiation and access.  We balk, however, at Citizens United’s 
indication that Congress may limit political contributions and expenditures 
only to prevent criminal bribery or the appearance of this bribery. 
Like several other broad declarations in the Citizens United opinion,200 the 
Court’s declaration that “[t]he practices Buckley noted would be covered by 
bribery laws if a quid pro quo arrangement [was] proved” was probably not 
meant literally.201  Justice Kennedy might not have had the definition of 
criminal bribery precisely in mind when he wrote those words, and he might 
not have meant to bind Congress’s regulatory power tightly to this narrow, 
contestable definition of a crime.  In McCormick v. United States,202 the 
Supreme Court held that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes 
only when “the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or 
undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”203 
In fact, Justice Kennedy himself criticized the Court’s requirement of an 
“explicit” quid pro quo one year after McCormick.  He wrote in a concurring 
opinion that a public official and his benefactor “need not state the quid pro 
quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by 
knowing winks and nods.”204  It seems unlikely that Citizens United meant 
to exclude from the category of quid pro quo corruption conduct that Justice 
Kennedy would treat as felonious. 
Moreover, Citizens United purported to follow Buckley, which spoke not 
of bribes but of “undue influence,”205 “improper influence,”206 and “post-
election special favors.”207  Buckley in fact rejected the argument that 
“contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery laws and 
narrowly drawn disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of 
dealing with ‘proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements.’”208  The 
Court explained, “[L]aws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes 
deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to 
influence government action.”209  Buckley upheld contribution limits not 
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because they prevented bribery “arrangements” that might be difficult to 
prove but because they blocked influences less “blatant and specific” than 
bribes.  The Court in fact pointed to several “deeply disturbing examples” of 
what it called quid pro quo corruption, and none of them involved bribery.210 
Post-Buckley decisions were equally clear.  The Court wrote in 2000 that 
its concern was “not confined to bribery of public officials, but extend[ed] to 
the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors.”211  A year later it declared that corruption must be “understood 
not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an 
officeholder’s judgment.”212  Three years later, the Court wrote, “Congress’ 
legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes 
corruption to curbing ‘undue influence.’”213  The Court added that it was “not 
only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for . . . donations 
and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.”214  An unexplained one-
sentence dictum should not cast into the void all of the Court’s prior 
descriptions of cognizable corruption. 
In fact, a post-Citizens United opinion joined by Justice Kennedy and three 
other members of the Citizens United majority made clear that cognizable 
corruption is broader than the “nothing but bribery” dictum suggests.  Chief 
Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC gave this 
explanation of why Buckley upheld contribution limits:  “The propriety of 
large contributions to individual candidates turned on the subjective intent of 
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donors, and the Court concluded that there was no way to tell which donors 
sought improper influence over legislators’ actions.”215 
It would be difficult to improve on this description of Buckley’s rationale.  
According to the McCutcheon plurality, seeking improper influence justifies 
restricting campaign contributions.  Moreover, because there is no practical 
way to determine when this corrupt intent exists, Congress may prohibit 
contributions large enough to pose a significant risk of this improper 
motivation. 
If, as the McCutcheon plurality recognized, deliberately seeking improper 
influence is corrupt, so is deliberately providing it.  Favoritism for donors is 
not itself bribery.  Every definition of criminal bribery requires either a 
corrupt understanding or a corrupt mental state at the time a benefit is 
received.  None includes subsequent favoritism for a benefactor.216  But even 
when a payoff of government benefits has not been arranged in advance, this 
payoff is corrupt.  Using public dollars to repay private favors is what Buckley 
meant when it spoke of quid pro quo corruption.  Both before and after 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court has treated this corruption as sufficient 
to justify contribution limits.  Despite Citizens United’s confusing dictum, 
we adhere in the discussion that follows to the Court’s long-standing view.217 
Buckley said that Congress may limit political contributions to prevent not 
only corruption but also the appearance of corruption.218  Although 
“appearance” has a myriad of meanings,219 the Court has left the term 
undefined for more than forty years. 
We think this term should be understood narrowly.  The “appearance of 
corruption” is not “anything that smells a bit like corruption.”  It is instead 
“something that is believed or suspected to be corruption.”  Of course the 
suspected corruption must be of the kind that justifies regulation. 
Moreover, an unreasonable belief in the existence of corruption cannot 
justify limiting speech.  The appropriate remedy for an unreasonable belief 
is not limiting speech but “more speech.”220  Thus the “appearance of 
corruption” should be understood to mean something that is reasonably 
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believed or suspected to be corruption or something that might in fact be 
corruption of the sort that justifies regulation. 
Of course, as the McCutcheon plurality recognized, motives are often 
mixed and rarely revealed, and inferences about particular situations and 
particular actors are likely to be speculative and fallible.  These inferences 
may reflect an observer’s trust or cynicism as much as or more than they 
reflect the actual motivations of public officials. 
Consider an exchange that occurred at the Senate hearing on the 
confirmation of Betsy DeVos to be Secretary of Education.  When Senator 
Bernie Sanders asked the nominee how much her family had contributed to 
the Republican Party over the years, she replied that she did not know.221  
She conceded, however, that $200 million was “in the ballpark.”  Sanders 
then asked, “Do you think, if you were not a multi-billionaire, if your family 
had not made hundreds of millions of dollars of contributions to the 
Republican Party, that you would be sitting here today?”  DeVos replied, 
“Senator, as a matter of fact, I do think that there would be that possibility.  
I’ve worked very hard on behalf of parents and children for the last almost 
30 years . . . .”222 
In the absence of DeVos’s family’s contributions, her nomination might 
have been “possible” just as she said, but she could no more deny that these 
contributions had prompted her nomination than Sanders could show that 
they had done so.  When the actions of elected officials benefit their 
supporters (as of course they usually do), these actions may reflect policy or 
principle rather than corruption.  Even when officials give corrupt payoffs to 
benefactors, however, they can almost always offer colorable public 
explanations. 
Although judgments about particular situations and particular actors are 
often problematic, global assessments—or judgments of statistical 
likelihood—can be easy.  When favor seekers make multi-million-dollar 
contributions to super PACs, one needs no more than a rudimentary 
understanding of human nature to expect more than occasional corruption.  
When elected officials then appear to advance the interests of wealthy donors 
rather than the public,223 the intuition seems confirmed.  In explaining why 
the appearance of corruption can justify limiting contributions, Buckley noted 
the importance of the public’s perception of government generally:  
“Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance 
of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of 
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”224 
 
 221. Valerie Strauss, Sanders to DeVos:  Would You Be Trump’s Education Nominee If 
You Weren’t a Billionaire?, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/18/sanders-to-devos-would-you-be-trumps-education-
nominee-if-you-werent-a-billionaire/?utm_term=.2e27e4b78907 [https://perma.cc/EF88-
9HC4]. 
 222. Id.  
 223. See supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text.   
 224. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
2338 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
Although Buckley upheld Congress’s power to limit political 
contributions, SpeechNow effectively abrogated it.  Since then, Buckley’s 
dark prophecy appears to have been fulfilled.  Confidence in the system of 
representative government has been “eroded to a disastrous extent.”  The 
following Parts of this Article provide some evidence. 
C.  The Presidential Campaign of 2016 
In the Democratic presidential primaries of 2016, Senator Bernie Sanders 
received more than twelve million votes, 43 percent of the total.225  Sanders’s 
refusal to accept any support from super PACs was a prominent feature of 
his campaign.  By the campaign’s end, audiences were chanting with him the 
amount of the average contribution he received—$27.226  He asked his 
principal primary opponent, “Are you qualified to be President of the United 
States when you’re raising millions of dollars from Wall Street whose greed, 
recklessness and illegal behavior helped to destroy our economy?”227 
When Sanders announced his candidacy, he offered this view of the 
corruption produced by unlimited political contributions:  “[T]he American 
political system has been totally corrupted, and the foundations of American 
democracy are being undermined.  What the Supreme Court essentially said 
was that it was not good enough for the billionaire class to own much of our 
economy.  They could now own the U.S. government as well.”228  Sanders 
added, “We now have a political situation where billionaires are literally able 
to buy elections and candidates.  Let’s not kid ourselves:  That is the reality 
right now.”229 
The nominee of the Democratic Party for President was former Senator 
and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.  The principal super PAC supporting 
her candidacy, Priorities USA Action, received donations of $1 million or 
more from seventy-seven individuals—and donations of $200 or more from 
759 individuals.230  Clinton nevertheless sharply criticized America’s system 
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of campaign finance.  She promised to “fight hard to end the stranglehold that 
the wealthy and special interests have on so much of our government,”231 to 
“appoint Supreme Court justices who will get money out of politics,”232 and 
“if necessary [to] pass a constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens 
United.”233 
The Republican Party’s nominee, developer Donald Trump, portrayed 
himself as “the ultimate outsider,”234 determined to “drain the swamp in 
Washington, D.C.”235  Although Trump later reconsidered,236 he initially 
pledged, 
I will not be controlled by the donors, special interests, and lobbyists who 
have corrupted our politics and politicians for far too long.  I have 
disavowed all Super PAC’s, requested the return of all donations made to 
said PAC’s, and I am calling on all Presidential candidates to do the 
same.237 
Trump contended: 
[I]t’s not just the political system that’s rigged.  It’s the whole economy.  
It’s rigged by big donors who want to keep down wages.  It’s rigged by big 
businesses who want to leave our country, fire our workers, and sell their 
products back into the U.S. with absolutely no consequences for them.  It’s 
rigged by bureaucrats who are trapping kids in failing schools.  It’s rigged 
against you, the American people.238 
In a primary debate, Trump declared, “[T]hese super PACs are a disaster, 
by the way, folks.  Very corrupt. . . .  There is total control of the candidates, 
I know it better than anybody that probably ever lived. . . .  I know it so well 
because I was on both sides of it . . . .  I’ve always made large 
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contributions.”239  He said of a Republican donor and a primary opponent, 
“Sheldon Adelson is looking to give big dollars to Rubio because he feels he 
can mold him into his perfect little puppet.  I agree!”240  He said of other 
opponents, “I wish good luck to all of the Republican candidates that traveled 
to California to beg for money etc. from the Koch Brothers.  Puppets?”241 
Trump called his Democratic opponent “Crooked Hillary,”242 and he 
addressed her roughly during the final debate of the campaign:  “I sat there 
watching ad after ad after ad, false ad.  All paid for by your friends on Wall 
Street that gave so much money because they know you’re going to protect 
them.”243 
The presidential campaign of 2016 and its outcome revealed that the 
appearance of corruption in America is widespread and intense.  Unfettered 
super PAC contributions have become, in the eyes of many, a potent symbol 
of America’s deep corruption. 
D.  Some Views of Elected Officials, Lobbyists, and Donors 
Like presidential candidates, federal officeholders, lobbyists, and super 
PAC donors have decried the corruption produced by America’s campaign 
finance system.  In 2015, former President Jimmy Carter said that America 
has become 
an oligarchy, with unlimited political bribery being the essence of getting 
the nominations for president or to elect the president.  And the same thing 
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[https://perma.cc/45BC-S7GL] (noting that Trump employed the insult at least fifty times 
within a six-week period).   
 243. Transcript of the Third Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/us/politics/third-debate-transcript.html 
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applies to governors and U.S. senators and congress members.  So now 
we’ve just seen a complete subversion of our political system as a payoff 
to major contributors, who want and expect and sometimes get favors for 
themselves after the election’s over.244 
Former Vice President Al Gore wrote in 2013 that “American democracy 
has been hacked” and that Congress “is now incapable of passing laws 
without permission from the corporate lobbies and other special interests that 
control their campaign finances.”245 
Representative Michele Bachmann spoke in 2011 of “the corrupt paradigm 
that has become Washington, D.C., whereby votes continually are bought 
rather than representatives voting the will of their constituents.”246 
Senator John McCain, the Republican nominee for President in 2008, said 
in 2012, “What we have done is made a contribution limit a joke.”  He added, 
“I promise you, there will be huge scandals, because there’s too much money 
washing around, too much of it we don’t know who’s behind it and too much 
corruption associated with that kind of money.  There will be major 
scandals.”247 
Senator John Kerry, the Democratic nominee for President in 2004, said in 
his last speech to the Senate before becoming Secretary of State in 2013, “The 
truth requires that we call the corrosion of money in politics what it is—it is 
a form of corruption and it muzzles more Americans than it empowers, and 
it is an imbalance that the world has taught us can only sow the seeds of 
unrest.”248 
Senator Lindsey Graham said in 2015, “We’ve got to figure out a way to 
fix this mess, because basically 50 people are running the whole show.”249 
Senator Angus King said in 2016, “[W]e can look around the world where 
oligarchs control the government, and we’re allowing that to happen here 
before our very eyes.”250 
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Senator Amy Klobuchar said in 2016, “This for me is the biggest issue of 
our time in our country because I have seen what this money has done to 
Washington.”251 
Jack Abramoff, a former lobbyist who served a prison term for bribery, 
said that, even apart from his illegal conduct, “I was participating in a system 
of legalized bribery.  All of it is bribery, every bit of it.”252 
Even some billionaire donors view unlimited super PAC contributions as 
corrupting.  Donald Sussman, who gave $39 million to Democratic super 
PACs and allied groups in 2016,253 told the Washington Post, “It’s very odd 
to be giving millions when your objective is to actually get the money out of 
politics.”254  Sheldon Adelson, who gave $78 million to Republican super 
PACs and allied groups in 2016,255 told an interviewer, “I’m against very 
wealthy people attempting to or influencing elections . . . .  But as long as it’s 
doable I’m going to do it.”256 
E.  Public Opinion 
Opinion surveys also indicate the depth of the appearance of corruption in 
America.257  In a 2015 Rasmussen survey, 59 percent of likely voters agreed 
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McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (plurality opinion).  In our view, this 
passage reflects an error that has infected much of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence.  The First Amendment protects Nazi parades and other offensive speech, but 
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that most members of Congress were “willing to sell their vote for either cash 
or a campaign contribution.”258  Fifty-six percent thought it likely that their 
own representatives had done so.259 
Fifty-four percent of the respondents to a 2012 Pew Research Center 
survey described the United States government as “mostly corrupt.”260 
In a 2010 survey by the Center for Competitive Politics, 65 percent of 
respondents agreed that a contribution of $10,000 or more could exert a 
corrupting influence on a candidate for Congress.261 
In a 2012 survey by Democracy Corps and the Public Campaign Action 
Fund, 59 percent of voters in fifty-four competitive congressional districts 
agreed that “[w]hen someone gives one million dollars to a Super PAC, they 
want something big in return from the candidates they are trying to elect.”262 
A 2012 Brennan Center for Justice survey focused specifically on super 
PACs.  It reported that 69 percent of respondents (74 percent of Republicans 
and 73 percent of Democrats) agreed that “new rules that allow individuals, 
corporations, and unions to donate unlimited amounts [of money] to Super 
PACs will lead to corruption.”263  Seventy-three percent of respondents (75 
percent of Republicans and 78 percent of Democrats) agreed that “there 
would be less corruption if there were limits on how much could be given to 
Super PACs.”264  Sixty-eight percent of respondents (71 percent of 
Democrats and 71 percent of Republicans) agreed that “a company that spent 
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502 (1975).  Nevertheless, we leave that proposition for another day and simply note that the 
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Holmes, and Brandeis.  Regulating political contributions and expenditures in an effort to 
prevent quid pro quo corruption is not remotely analogous to suppressing unpopular speech. 
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$100,000 to help elect a member of Congress could successfully pressure him 
or her to change a vote on proposed legislation.”265 
In a March 2012 ABC News/Washington Post survey, 69 percent of 
respondents stated that super PACs should be illegal.266 
A 2016 University of Maryland survey reported that 89 percent of 
registered voters (92 percent of Trump supporters and 88 percent of Clinton 
supporters) agreed that “elected officials think more about the interests of 
their campaign donors than the common good of the people.”267  Eighty-five 
percent of these voters (82 percent of Trump supporters and 90 percent of 
Clinton supporters) favored “trying to reduce the amount of money flowing 
into political campaigns and Super PACs.”268 
The Supreme Court said in Citizens United, “[T]he appearance of influence 
or access will not cause the electorate to lose faith in this democracy.”269  
Eight years after Citizens United and SpeechNow, however, faith in our 
democracy appears to be at a nadir.  The polling data reveal that unlimited 
super PAC contributions have played a significant part in intensifying public 
perceptions of corruption.270 
IV.  CHALLENGING SPEECHNOW 
When a presidential candidate promises to appoint Supreme Court Justices 
who will overrule Citizens United,271 her audience may imagine that Citizens 
United would not last long if the candidate were elected and kept her promise.  
Whenever a majority of the Court was prepared to overrule Citizens United, 
someone would bring an appropriate case, and the decision would vanish.  
The obstacles to bringing an appropriate case, however, are substantial.  
Whatever its composition, the Supreme Court may not have an opportunity 
to overrule Citizens United. 
Similarly, although the Court has not addressed the issue decided by 
SpeechNow, it may never be able to do so.  The authors of this Article are 
among the lawyers currently representing members of Congress and 
candidates for Congress who are attempting to bring this issue before the 
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Court.  The Federal Election Commission is opposing their efforts on grounds 
that, if successful, could keep the Court from ever deciding the issue. 
A court’s ability to reconsider a decision upholding a statute differs from 
its ability to reconsider a decision striking a statute down.  When a court 
upholds a challenged statute, its ruling binds the party who has challenged 
this statute, but someone else threatened with enforcement can bring another 
challenge and ask the court to overrule its earlier decision.  If this party fails, 
a third party can bring a third challenge.  The challengers of a statute can 
keep trying until victory is won.  Citizens United, which overruled two prior 
decisions upholding federal election laws, illustrates the process.272 
Once a court holds a statute unconstitutional, however, enforcement of the 
statute usually comes to a halt.  Nonenforcement of the statute then becomes 
an injury shared by all members of the public, and no one may have standing 
to challenge it.273  The law of standing may thus place decisions about the 
constitutionality of statutes on a one-way ratchet.  Any triumph of a statute’s 
defenders may prove transient, but any triumph of a challenger (even at the 
hands of a closely divided Supreme Court) may prove permanent and 
incontestable.  Constitutional litigation can become a game of sudden death, 
but only for one side.  Although a presumption of constitutionality is thought 
to tilt the game board against litigants who challenge a statute’s 
constitutionality,274 the law of standing appears to tilt the board in the 
opposite direction. 
When the Justice Department failed to seek Supreme Court review of 
SpeechNow275 and the FEC acquiesced in this decision,276 the enforcement 
of federal limits on super PAC contributions ceased.  For a time, several states 
and one municipality continued to enforce their own limits, but the federal 
courts of appeals sustained challenges to their efforts.277  None of the states 
sought Supreme Court review,278 and the petition for certiorari filed by the 
municipality did not address the SpeechNow syllogism the Court of Appeals 
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had endorsed.  Indeed, this petition did not include SpeechNow among the 
five cases it cited.279 
With the denial of the municipality’s petition and the failure of the states 
to seek review, the path to the Supreme Court seemed almost closed.  
Nevertheless, John Bonifaz, president of the public-interest organization Free 
Speech for People, Ronald A. Fein, the group’s legal director, and some 
volunteer lawyers including the authors of this Article sought ways to bring 
the constitutionality of limiting super PAC contributions before the Court. 
One potential route to Supreme Court review was the enactment of 
legislation incompatible with the right declared by SpeechNow.  A stream of 
legislation following Roe v. Wade280 has given the Court repeated 
opportunities to overrule that decision.  Defenders of post-Roe restrictions on 
abortion can argue that these restrictions are consistent with Roe or, in the 
alternative, that Roe should be overruled.  Unlike Roe, however, SpeechNow 
did not create a right whose boundaries were uncertain.  Legislatures can 
resist SpeechNow only by enacting and enforcing limits on super PAC 
contributions similar to those the D.C. Circuit struck down. 
Free Speech for People encourages legislatures to enact these limits, 
especially in places where federal courts of appeals have not yet ruled on 
their validity.  Unlike some legislative efforts to limit abortion, these limits 
would not defy the courts’ authority; they might instead enable the Supreme 
Court to consider an issue it has not yet addressed. 
In October 2017, the St. Petersburg, Florida, city council approved an 
ordinance limiting super PAC contributions drafted primarily by Mr. Fein.281  
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A few months earlier, the Connecticut House of Representatives voted to 
approve legislation limiting super PAC contributions,282 but the legislative 
session ended without action by the Senate.  Legislation limiting super PAC 
contributions is currently under consideration in Massachusetts.283  Equal 
Citizens, a nonprofit group founded by Harvard Law Professor Lawrence 
Lessig, has announced that it will attempt to bring the SpeechNow issue 
before the Supreme Court by challenging the failure of the Alaska Attorney 
General to enforce existing Alaska laws limiting super PAC contributions.284 
Federal election law provided another potential route to Supreme Court 
review.  Although the failure to enforce a statute is usually seen as an injury 
shared by everyone and challengeable by no one, there are exceptions, and 
the 1974 statute establishing the FEC created one of these exceptions. 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the 
1974 statute and other enactments, provides that anyone may complain to the 
FEC about any violation of federal election law and that anyone “aggrieved” 
by either the dismissal of his complaint or the failure of the Commission to 
act within 120 days may secure a judicial ruling on whether the FEC’s action 
or inaction is “contrary to law.”285 
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts may afford review in 
accordance with these provisions when a complainant satisfies Article III 
standing requirements.286  The complainant must show among other things a 
threat of “injury in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the agency’s failure to 
enforce the law.  The “injury in fact” requirement imposed by Article III is 
thought to be more demanding than the statutory requirement that the 
complainant be a “party aggrieved.”287 
The ability of private parties to secure judicial enforcement of federal 
election law is a crucial part of FECA’s enforcement mechanism.  FECA 
provides that no more than three of the FEC’s six members may be members 
of the same party.288  Four members must agree before the agency can act,289 
and the agency is widely regarded as dysfunctional.290  One current FEC 
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Commissioner commented, “Congress set this place up to gridlock. . . .  This 
agency is functioning as Congress intended.”291  When the FEC fails to 
enforce the law, however, citizens may go to court. 
The people most clearly threatened with injury in fact by the FEC’s 
acquiescence in SpeechNow and its failure to enforce the federal limits on 
contributions to super PACs are candidates for federal office—especially 
candidates opposed by super PACs that receive contributions above the limit.  
Free Speech for People identified six elected officeholders and candidates 
who wished to challenge the FEC’s failure to enforce the limit.  They were 
Representative Ted Lieu (D-Cal.); Representative Walter Jones (R-N.C.); 
Senator Jeff Merkley (D-Or.); former state Senator John Howe, a Republican 
candidate for Congress in Minnesota; Michael Wager, a Democratic 
candidate for Congress in Ohio; and Zephyr Teachout, a Democratic 
candidate for Congress in New York.292  A number of lawyers volunteered 
to work with Free Speech for People in representing these complainants, 
including Anne Weismann, Stephen A. Weisbrod, Brad Deutsch, Malcolm 
Seymour, Andrew Goodman, and us. 
On July 7, 2016, with the general election campaigns of 2016 barely 
underway, Representative Lieu and the others filed their complaint with the 
FEC.293  The FEC might have dismissed this complaint promptly, citing its 
earlier acquiescence in SpeechNow.  The complainants then could have 
sought review in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  That 
court, which was bound to follow SpeechNow, also might have denied relief 
quickly.  The complainants then could have appealed to the court of appeals 
and urged it to overrule SpeechNow.  The likelihood that the court of appeals 
would overrule its unanimous en banc decision was small, however, and a 
three-judge panel of the court would not have had authority to do so.294  If 
the court of appeals denied relief, the complainants could have sought 
Supreme Court review.  This path to Supreme Court review may look 
straightforward, but it is filled with booby traps. 
The statutory period of 120 days ended without an FEC ruling, and little 
agency activity seems to have occurred within this period.  The Lieu 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/dysfunction-and-deadlock-at-the-federal-
election-commission.html [https://perma.cc/8RVS-9VE9]; Eliza Newlin Carney, The FEC’s 
Open Hostilities, Dysfunction, and Intimidation Foreshadowed the Trump Era, AM. PROSPECT 
(Mar. 2, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/fec%E2%80%99s-open-hostilities-dysfunction-
and-intimidation-foreshadowed-trump-era [https://perma.cc/7W6C-2944]; Will Tucker, The 
FEC:  “Acting” Like an Enforcement Agency, OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/06/the-fec-acting-like-an-enforcement-agency/ 
[https://perma.cc/TA2N-8988].  
 291. Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C. Can’t Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-
election-abuse-commission-chief-says.html [https://perma.cc/WYQ8-TJNB].   
 292. Complaint, Lieu v. House Majority PAC, MUR No. 7101 (FEC dismissed May 25, 
2017), https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/FINAL-FEC-Complaint-
PDF-7-7-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GMH-Y8LW].  
 293. Id. 
 294. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“One three-judge 
panel . . . does not have the authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court.”).   
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complaint listed as respondents ten super PACs that had campaigned against 
one or more of the complainants and that had accepted contributions above 
the statutory limit.295  It noted thirty-nine contributions above the limit from 
twenty-seven contributors these super PACs had received.  After receiving 
the complaint, the FEC invited responses not only from the named 
respondents but also from all of the contributors identified in the complaint.  
Many of the mostly well-known law firms representing the contributors and 
the super PACs then sought extensions of time, and twenty-two ultimately 
filed responses to the complaint.296 
The responses of many contributors expressed bafflement that the FEC had 
invited their responses although they were not respondents.  Under FECA, 
the FEC need not invite responses even from named respondents before 
dismissing a complaint.297  No response denied what the FEC’s public 
records and the respondents’ own disclosures revealed—that the respondents 
did accept contributions above the limit, just as SpeechNow and an FEC 
advisory opinion authorized them to do. 
A few responses sharply criticized the complainants.  Lawyers 
representing the House Majority PAC, the Senate Majority PAC, and several 
individual contributors to super PACs supporting Democrats wrote: 
[I]t is lucky for complainants that the Commission has never adopted a 
sanction for frivolous filings because this would surely fail the threshold 
for a good faith complaint. . . .  [I]n order to discourage similar stunts in the 
future, we suggest the Commission indicate in the close out letter that this 
was a frivolous complaint that wasted government and private resources.298 
Perhaps these lawyers would have had equally harsh words for Thurgood 
Marshall and the other NAACP lawyers who in 1951 filed a lawsuit 
challenging school segregation—a suit that could not have succeeded in the 
district court in light of Plessy v. Ferguson299 and other precedents allowing 
racial segregation.300  Perhaps these lawyers also would have considered 
sanctions appropriate for the FEC at the time of the SpeechNow litigation.  In 
SpeechNow, the agency defended the constitutionality of limits on 
 
 295. Complaint, supra note 292. 
 296. The firms representing respondents and contributors included Jones Day; Perkins 
Coie; Covington & Burling; Wiley Rein; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Caplin & 
Drysdale; Rose Law Firm; and Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer.  Their responses are available 
online. See MUR #7101, FED.  ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-
under-review/7101/ [https://perma.cc/NC5D-MATC] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).   
 297. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) (2012) (“Before the Commission conducts any vote on 
the complaint, other than a vote to dismiss, any person so notified shall have the opportunity 
to demonstrate, in writing, . . . that no action should be taken . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
11 C.F.R. § 111.5(a) (2018) (requiring notice of a complaint only for respondents).  
 298. Letter from Marc E. Elias, Ezra W. Reese, and Katherine T. LaBeau, to Jeff S. Jordan, 
Office of Gen. Counsel, Fed. Election Comm’n (Sept. 6, 2016), http://eqs.fec.gov/ 
eqsdocsMUR/17044420697.pdf [https://perma.cc/669L-LRKR].  
 299. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
 300. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy). 
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contributions to super PACs although the D.C. Circuit had already held in 
EMILY’s List v. FEC301 that these limits were unconstitutional.302 
As the lawyers for the House Majority PAC and the Senate Majority PAC 
contended, the Lieu complaint led to a waste of government and private 
resources.  We cannot guess how many thousands of dollars they and other 
lawyers charged their clients for filing responses describing law the plaintiffs 
had acknowledged in their complaint. 
On November 4, 2016, four days before Election Day, the complainants 
filed suit against the FEC in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia.303  They alleged that the agency’s failure to act within the 120-
day period was, in the words of the applicable statutory standard, “contrary 
to law.”304 
On reading the statute, one might have thought that the FEC’s failure to 
act would be contrary to law if it had failed to enforce the law—in other 
words, if it had not acted on a meritorious complaint within 120 days.  This 
straightforward reading would have allowed complainants to seek judicial 
enforcement when the agency itself did not enforce the law promptly.  
Congress apparently realized that, when the remedy for an election-law 
violation comes after an election, it is likely to come too late.305 
In 1986, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected the view that the FEC’s 
inaction can be contrary to law simply because the agency failed to enforce 
the law.306  It also declined to impose a requirement or even a presumption 
that the FEC must rule on a complaint within a single election cycle.307  The 
court held that the agency’s failure to act on a complaint is contrary to law 
only when its delay has been arbitrary and capricious.308  It added that a judge 
should consider the resources available to the agency, the press of other 
business, the complexity of the case, and other circumstances in determining 
whether the agency’s delay has been arbitrary and capricious.309 
The FEC filed an answer to the complainants’ (now plaintiffs’) lawsuit.  It 
also sought and obtained a protective order to prevent the plaintiffs from 
disclosing confidential information they might receive during the litigation.  
It served interrogatories asking the plaintiffs to describe how they had been 
injured by its nonenforcement of the limits on super PAC contributions.  The 
plaintiffs served interrogatories inquiring about the reasons for the FEC’s 
delay and the actions it had taken since they filed their complaint. 
 
 301. 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
 302. Id. at 8–11. 
 303. See Matea Gold, Legal Team Seeking to Undo Super PACs Files Suit to Push FEC to 
Act, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 
2016/11/04/legal-team-seeking-to-undo-super-pacs-files-suit-to-push-fec-to-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/A84F-SKJT].  
 304. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) (2012). 
 305. See, e.g., id. § 30108(a)(2) (requiring the FEC to issue an advisory opinion within 
twenty days when a candidate has requested this opinion within sixty days of an election).  
 306. FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 307. Id. at 1084–85.   
 308. Id.  
 309. Id. at 1084 & n.6.   
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On June 1, 2017, nearly eleven months after the plaintiffs filed their 
administrative complaint, the FEC sent a letter rejecting it.310  After receiving 
the letter, the plaintiffs moved to amend their district court complaint to 
challenge the FEC’s rejection of their administrative complaint.  The FEC 
opposed this motion, and, at the time of this writing (March 2018), the court 
has not ruled.311 
A plaintiff’s standing is ordinarily judged at the time a complaint is 
filed.312  By forcing the plaintiffs to refile their complaint rather than amend 
it, the FEC apparently hopes to move the date for assessing their standing 
from shortly before the election of 2016 (a time when some plaintiffs were 
actively opposed by super PACs that accepted contributions above the limit) 
to more than a year after the election. 
Of course, if the FEC had rejected the plaintiffs’ complaint within 120 
days, no one could have doubted the appropriateness of a determination of 
standing on the pre-election date.  Refusing an amendment would reward the 
FEC’s delay in dismissing the complaint and encourage it to delay in other 
cases.  Whenever a candidate sought prospective relief, the FEC might delay 
action on his case until after Election Day in the hope that his ability to 
challenge an adverse ruling would vanish. 
The FEC argues that, because the district court complaint challenging the 
agency’s unlawful delay is now moot, the court lacks jurisdiction to amend 
the complaint.  The agency thus maintains that its ruling deprived the 
plaintiffs of the ability to challenge its delay (by making the delay moot) 
while its delay deprived them of the ability to challenge its ruling (by pushing 
the date for determining their standing beyond Election Day).313  This sort of 
bind is called a Catch-22.314 
 
 310. See FEC Dismisses Lawmakers’ Complaint Against Super PACs, BLOOMBERG (June 
15, 2017), https://www.bna.com/fec-dismisses-lawmakers-n73014453387/ [https://perma.cc/ 
D2HP-9YU8]. 
 311. The remainder of this Part offers an overview of the arguments the parties have made 
concerning the plaintiffs’ motion to amend.  These arguments are found in three documents 
filed in Lieu v. FEC, No. 16 Civ. 2201 (EGS) (D.D.C. filed Nov. 14, 2016):  Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, Lieu, No. 16 Civ. 2201 
(EGS) (D.D.C. June 22, 2017), ECF No. 21-1; Federal Election Commission’s Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, Lieu, No. 16 Civ. 2201 (EGS) 
(D.D.C. July 17, 2017), ECF No. 25; Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Complaint, Lieu, No. 16 Civ. 2201 (EGS) (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2017), ECF No. 28.  
Our goal is not to explore the arguments in depth but simply to show what an obstacle course 
the plaintiffs must navigate to secure the D.C. Circuit’s reconsideration and the Supreme 
Court’s review of SpeechNow. 
 312. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 190–91 
(2000); Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 313. The plaintiffs respond that, because the FEC’s delay is capable of repetition and likely 
to evade review, the initial complaint is not moot. See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. 
United States, 570 F.3d 316, 324–35 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that a claim of unreasonable 
delay in issuing a license was not mooted by issuance of the license because the agency was 
likely to engage in similar delay when the plaintiff sought other licenses).  The plaintiffs also 
note that when action by the government renders an initial complaint moot, the Supreme Court 
has allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint to challenge the new governmental action. 
Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church of Miami, 404 U.S. 412, 415 (1972) (per curiam). 
 314. See JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1955). 
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The FEC also argues that the court should refuse to allow amendment 
because amendment would be futile; it contends that the amended complaint 
would be subject to dismissal on several grounds.  The plaintiffs respond that 
a complaint is not always futile simply because a trial court must dismiss it.  
In 1951, for example, Supreme Court precedent required a trial court to deny 
relief to the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education,315 but the complaint 
of these plaintiffs changed history.  The plaintiffs argue that the court should 
exercise its discretion to amend the complaint before considering whether to 
dismiss it. 
The FEC argues that its acquiescence in SpeechNow would be “contrary to 
law” only if its decision was “arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of 
discretion.”  The plaintiffs maintain that “arbitrary or capricious” is the 
standard of review only when an agency is entitled to deference of one sort 
or another.  They say that, when a ruling on a purely legal question is entitled 
to neither Chevron deference316 nor Skidmore deference,317 it is entitled to 
no deference at all. 
The FEC claims that, whether or not its acquiescence in SpeechNow was 
contrary to law, it was required to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.  In an 
advisory opinion sought by a super PAC, it had authorized super PACs to 
accept contributions above the statutory limit,318 and FECA provides that 
someone who relies in good faith on an FEC advisory opinion “shall not . . . 
be subject to any sanction provided by this Act.”319  Although the plaintiffs 
have sought only declaratory relief, the FEC maintains that declaratory relief 
is itself a sanction.  Because the agency’s advisory opinion deprived it of the 
ability to impose this supposed sanction, the FEC was required to reject the 
plaintiffs’ complaint. 
The FEC’s position abandons the usual meaning of the word “sanction”—
a penalty or detriment imposed for violation of a legal requirement.320  
Moreover, judicial acceptance of the FEC’s conclusion would provide a way 
for the agency to insulate all rulings allowing unlawful practices from judicial 
review.  It would be enough for the agency to announce its rulings in advisory 
opinions.  FECA, however, allows courts to review FEC failures to enforce 
the law,321 and a construction of the statute that would allow the FEC to 
nullify this provision cannot be correct. 
 
 315. 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (citing Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)), rev’d, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 316. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(affording deference when an agency construes a “statute which it administers”).   
 317. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (affording deference when an 
agency has relevant expertise a court lacks).  
 318. See FEC, Advisory Opinion 2010-11, supra note 32. 
 319. 52 U.S.C. § 30108(c)(2) (2012). 
 320. See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 340 (2010) (“A ‘sanction’ (in the 
sense the word is used here) is ‘[t]he detriment loss of reward, or other coercive intervention, 
annexed to a violation of a law as a means of enforcing the law.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Sanction, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2211 (2d ed. 1954))).  
 321. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C).  
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The FEC maintains that, because its advisory opinion authorized the 
respondents’ conduct, it could not find this conduct unlawful.  In this 
argument, the FEC appears to enter the realm of legal philosophy, agreeing 
with some legal positivists that any conduct not subject to legal sanction is 
lawful.  From this perspective, if diplomats have immunity from legal 
sanctions when they commit murder, it is lawful for diplomats to murder. 
Just as FECA bars administrative sanctions when people have relied on 
FEC advisory opinions, a number of doctrines bar criminal punishment when 
defendants have relied reasonably on apparently authoritative assurances that 
their conduct would be lawful.  These doctrines have such names as “official 
authorization,”322 “entrapment by estoppel,”323 “advice of counsel,”324 and 
“mistake of law.”325  Although these doctrines sometimes excuse an actor’s 
conduct, the conduct remains unlawful.326  A mistake of law does not change 
the law—not even when it rests on an advisory opinion issued by the FEC.327 
When the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief from the FEC, they expected 
not to get it.  The chance of victory before their case reached the Supreme 
Court was small.  The plaintiffs, however, have been required to fight many 
battles just to keep their case on the track that heads toward the Court.  The 
FEC’s strenuous efforts, not to defend its actions but to block any review of 
its actions, may bring to mind such classics as Charles Dickens’s Bleak 
House,328 Rod Serling’s The Twilight Zone,329 and Philip K. Howard’s The 
Death of Common Sense.330  Lieu v. FEC shows how burdensome and 
ridiculous federal procedure has become. 
Skirmishes in the back alleys of federal procedure will continue in Lieu v. 
FEC for some time.  If the FEC succeeds in delivering a fatal blow to the 
 
 322. See Keathley v. Holder, 696 F.3d 644, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 323. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959); United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 
767, 773–75 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 324. See United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 325. See United States v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he government 
argued that mistake of law is never a defense.  There is an exception to the mistake of law 
doctrine, however, in circumstances where the mistake results from the defendant’s reasonable 
reliance upon an official—but mistaken or later overruled—statement of the law.”). United 
States v. Qualls, 172 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1999), arguably overruled Albertini’s conclusion that 
a defendant’s reliance on a judicial decision was reasonable, but it did not question Albertini’s 
description of the mistake of law defense. 
 326. The D.C. Circuit has held, for example, that a defendant charged with a specific-intent 
crime “is entitled to an advice-of-counsel instruction if he introduces evidence showing:  (1) he 
made full disclosure of all material facts to his attorney before receiving the advice at issue; 
and (2) he relied in good faith on the counsel’s advice that his course of conduct was legal.” 
DeFries, 129 F.3d at 1308.  Although a lawyer’s erroneous advice can thus give his client a 
defense, a lawyer’s advice cannot amend the law.   
 327. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139 (1961) (noting the inaccuracy of 
reducing law to the proposition that “[t]he score is what the scorer says it is”). 
 328. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Nofton 1996) (1853). 
 329. See Adrienne LaFrance, How The Twilight Zone Predicted Our Paranoid Present, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 31, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/12/how-
em-the-twilight-zone-em-predicted-our-paranoid-present/282700/ [https://perma.cc/3WZ6-
P4JX] (describing the television series that ran from 1959 through 1964).  
 330. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:  HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING 
AMERICA (1994). 
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case in one of these skirmishes, it may prevent the Supreme Court from ever 
considering whether the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow is correct.  
Moreover, any ground that prevents the Supreme Court from considering the 
validity of SpeechNow is likely to block the Court from reviewing or 
reconsidering any other final decision striking down an election law, 
including Citizens United.  Even people who applaud SpeechNow and 
Citizens United should be troubled by constitutional law’s one-way ratchet 
and by decisions that permanently immunize lower court decisions and five-
to-four Supreme Court decisions from reconsideration.331 
CONCLUSION 
A reader might well ask, “If the arguments presented in this paper are 
sound, why have twenty-four federal circuit judges in six federal courts of 
appeals rejected them?”  The premise of the question, however, is mistaken.  
No judge has rejected any of the arguments presented in this paper. 
Many judges have disagreed with this Article’s ultimate conclusions 
(1) that federal limits on contributions to super PACs are valid and (2) that 
nothing in Citizens United should lead to a contrary conclusion.  As the 
SpeechNow bandwagon gained momentum,332 however, no court focused on 
any of the arguments this Article has offered in support of its position.  As 
 
 331. What position the Justice Department will take when Lieu v. FEC reaches the court of 
appeals and the Supreme Court is uncertain.  In SpeechNow, the Justice Department defended 
the constitutionality of the federal statute limiting contributions to super PACs, and “[a] major 
part of the duty of the Solicitor General is to defend laws passed by Congress.” Stephen 
Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students:  What Does the Solicitor General Do?, SCOTUSBLOG 
(May 2, 2012, 10:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/scotus-for-law-students-
what-does-the-solicitor-general-do-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law/ [https://perma.cc/BC3V-
XNYU].  Indeed, “[t]he Office generally takes the position that it will defend any act of 
Congress for which there is a plausible argument to be made that a statute is constitutional.” 
Id.  The Department’s duty to defend a congressional enactment, the validity of which the 
Supreme Court has never considered, should trump its obligation to defend the position of a 
particular federal agency that has declined to enforce this enactment in reliance on a lower 
court decision.  The Solicitor General should decline to represent the FEC and should allow 
this body to be represented by other counsel.  He should in fact file an amicus brief in support 
of the plaintiffs’ position.  
President Trump’s denunciations of super PACs and the administration’s political interests 
also counsel support for the plaintiffs.  Championing the right to give $20 million to a super 
PAC would not make any administration popular, and, in view of President Trump’s strong 
statements on the subject, it would be especially incongruous for his administration to defend 
this supposed right. See supra notes 237–43. 
 332. Compare N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(“Few contested legal questions are answered so consistently by so many courts and judges.”), 
and Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We 
tread a well-worn path.”), with IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK:  PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF 
POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (1982) (noting the tendency of groupthink to supplant 
independent critical thinking and describing how this phenomenon contributed to policy 
fiascoes in five presidential administrations).  One naturally tends to assume that “Fifty 
Million Frenchmen Can’t Be Wrong,” see almonkitt, Sophie Tucker 50 Million Frenchmen 
Can’t Be Wrong, YOUTUBE (Dec. 29, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-
IP0DE2kTI [https://perma.cc/W9YW-7D83], but they probably can be. 
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best we can tell, these arguments simply were not advanced in any of the 
cases.333 
SpeechNow took as its premise one sentence of the Citizens United 
opinion:  “[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures . . . do not give 
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”334  The D.C. Circuit 
declared that, if independent expenditures do not corrupt, the contributions 
that make these expenditures possible cannot corrupt either.335 
This Article offered two arguments about the Court’s premise.  First, this 
Supreme Court statement was dictum.  It was in fact dictum twice over.336  
This statement came after the Court had resolved the case before it twice, and 
the statement advanced neither the Court’s holding nor the “extra” ground of 
decision it suggested. 
Second, the Supreme Court probably did not mean this statement 
literally.337  The D.C. Circuit’s analysis depended on reading the statement 
to say not just that independent expenditures are insufficiently corrupting to 
justify their restriction but also that these expenditures do not corrupt even a 
smidgen.  Other passages of Citizens United and the Court’s decision in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.338 suggest that the Court did not mean to 
sweep so far beyond the issues before it.  Neither SpeechNow nor any of the 
decisions that followed it focused on whether this statement was holding 
rather than dictum, and none paused over indications that the Supreme Court 
might not have meant its statement literally. 
We said that the SpeechNow syllogism itself was fallacious.  Contributions 
to a super PAC can corrupt even when the group’s expenditures do not 
corrupt and in fact do the world great good.  As Buckley recognized, it is the 
people who write the checks—not the money spenders—who typically 
corrupt and create the appearance of corruption.339  Neither SpeechNow nor 
any of the decisions that followed it examined challenges to the supposed 
syllogism. 
We offered two criticisms of the syllogism’s conclusion—that 
“contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures . . . cannot 
corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.”340  First, this conclusion is 
silly.  When a legislator agrees to vote in favor of widget subsidies in 
exchange for a $1 million contribution to a super PAC supporting his 
candidacy, he commits the crime of bribery.  Declaring that “there is no 
 
 333. Before Citizens United and SpeechNow, a Fourth Circuit panel concluded that North 
Carolina had not shown that contributions to independent expenditure committees were 
sufficiently corrupting to justify their limitation. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 
274, 293–94 (4th Cir. 2008).  Judge M. Blane Michael, however, dissented. Id. at 332–37 
(Michael, J., dissenting).  The vote in favor of striking down limits on contributions to super 
PACs thus has not been unanimous, and the late Judge Michael is our hero. 
 334. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
 335. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 336. See supra Part I.B. 
 337. See supra Part I.C. 
 338. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 339. Buckey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55–56 (1976) (per curiam). 
 340. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694.   
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corrupting ‘quid’ for which a candidate might in exchange offer a corrupt 
‘quo’”341 does not pass the laugh test.  Yet the five courts of appeals that 
followed SpeechNow maintained straight faces, apparently because they did 
not notice that declaring super PAC contributions noncorrupting as a matter 
of law would make openly trading these contributions for government 
benefits a constitutional right. 
Second, the syllogism’s conclusion cannot be reconciled with Buckley v. 
Valeo, in which the Supreme Court said, “It is unnecessary to look beyond 
the Act’s primary purpose to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption 
resulting from large individual financial contributions in order to find a 
constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1000 . . . limitation [on 
contributions to candidates].”342  Neither the D.C. Circuit nor any of the 
courts that embraced its decision addressed what should have been the central 
issue in the cases before them—whether contributions to super PACs can 
reasonably be distinguished from the contributions to candidates whose 
limitation Buckley upheld. 
Unlike SpeechNow or any of the decisions that echoed it, we reviewed the 
distinctions Buckley drew between contributions and expenditures.  We noted 
initially that each of the three reasons Buckley offered for treating 
contributions to candidates as low-value speech applies fully to contributions 
to super PACs.  Like a donation to a candidate, (1) a super PAC contribution 
does not convey the underlying basis for the contributor’s support, (2) its 
transformation into debate requires speech by someone other than the 
contributor, and (3) limiting it does not prevent the contribution from serving 
as a symbolic expression of support or restrict the contributor’s ability to 
discuss candidates and issues.  To use the language of FEC v. Beaumont, 
Buckley and its progeny require treating contribution limits as “marginal 
speech restrictions subject to relatively complaisant review under the First 
Amendment, because contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of 
political expression.”343 
Moreover, one of the Buckley Court’s two reasons for viewing 
contributions to candidates as less corrupting than expenditures applies 
equally to contributions to super PACs.  Although the rules forbidding the 
coordination of independent expenditures with the expenditures of a 
candidate are thought to inhibit corrupt transactions between candidates and 
super PAC managers, they cannot inhibit corrupt transactions between 
candidates and super PAC donors.  These rules do not limit what candidates 
and super PAC donors may say to one another. 
The Buckley Court’s remaining distinction between contributions to 
candidates and independent expenditures was that direct contributions may 
be more valuable to candidates.  Similarly, candidates may value 
contributions to their official campaigns more than they do contributions to 
super PACs.  A candidate, however, does not value a $5500 contribution to 
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his campaign more than he does a $1 million contribution to a super PAC 
whose mission is to support his candidacy.  The Supreme Court’s ruling that 
Congress may prohibit the $5500 contribution because it is corrupting or 
creates the appearance of corruption cannot be reconciled with the D.C. 
Circuit’s ruling that the $1 million contribution is protected because it does 
not create even an appearance of corruption.  SpeechNow and the decisions 
echoing it have created a perverse campaign finance regime—one in which, 
although donations supporting candidates are unlimited, donors must channel 
these donations to less responsible, more destructive, and less authoritative 
speakers than the candidates themselves. 
The ultimate question posed by Buckley is whether super PAC 
contributions create a sufficient appearance of corruption to justify their 
limitation.  In 2018, the appearance of corruption in America is widespread 
and intense.  In the presidential campaign of 2016, candidates of both parties 
decried government by the wealthy and denounced super PACs.  
Condemnations of “Wall Street,” “Silicon Valley,” “Hollywood,” “the 
billionaire class,” “big banks,” “super PACs,” and “the one percent” now 
seem as common as denunciations of ISIS.  Opinion polls confirm the 
public’s loss of faith in our democracy, and Washington insiders voice the 
same discouragement and mistrust as the public.  The super PACs spawned 
by SpeechNow have become powerful symbols of corruption. 
Because the most recent of the decisions endorsing SpeechNow came in 
2013, the authors of these decisions could not have known the full extent of 
the appearance of corruption their decisions would produce.  Moreover, the 
judges who decided SpeechNow in 2010 might have been unaware not only 
of the consequences of abrogating the limits on political contributions but 
also of the fact that they were abrogating these limits.  David Keating, 
president of the nonprofit association SpeechNow and the principal architect 
of the SpeechNow litigation, told an interviewer in 2015 that using an 
independent expenditure group to promote a particular candidate “just never 
entered my mind. . . .  But it’s totally obvious when you think about it.”344  
Attorney General Holder said that the Justice Department did not seek 
Supreme Court review of SpeechNow because this decision would “affect 
only a small subset of federally regulated contributions.”345  The judges of 
the D.C. Circuit might have been no less oblivious than the parties on both 
sides to the beast that was about to emerge from their opinion.346 
SpeechNow in fact transformed American politics, intensified class 
division and mistrust, and helped to reduce faith in our democracy to a nadir.  
A ruling so consequential should not have been left to the D.C. Circuit or 
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even to six courts of appeals.  Eight years after SpeechNow, the ability of 
Congress to limit super PAC contributions awaits and requires the Supreme 
Court’s attention. 
Stay tuned.347 
 
 347. After the authors and editors completed work on this Article, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint in Lieu v. FEC, 
a case discussed supra Part IV. Minute Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint and Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as Moot, Lieu 
v. FEC, No. 16 Civ. 2201 (EGS) (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2018).  The FEC is now likely to present 
many of the same arguments on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment that 
it made in contending that amending the complaint would be futile. 
